The likelihood principle states that the visual system prefers the most likely interpretation of a stimulus, whereas the simplicity principle states that it prefers the most simple interpretation. This study investigates how close these seemingly very different principles are by combining findings from classical, algorithmic, and structural information theory. It is argued that, in visual perception, the two principles are perhaps very different with respect to the viewpoint-independent aspects of perception but probably very close with respect to the viewpoint-dependent aspects which, moreover, seem decisive in everyday perception. This implies that either principle may have guided the evolution of visual systems and that the simplicity paradigm may provide perception models with the necessary quantitative specifications of the often plausible but also intuitive ideas provided by the likelihood paradigm.
In visual perception research, an ongoing debate concerns the question of whether the likelihood principle (Von Helmholtz, 1909 or the simplicity principle (Hochberg & McAlister, 1953) provides the best explanation of the human interpretation of visual stimuli. The phenomenon to be explained is, more specifically, that human subjects usually show a clear preference for only one interpretation of a stimulus even though, generally, any stimulus can be interpreted in many ways (Figure 1 ). To explain this phenomenon, the likelihood principle states that the visual system has a preference for the most likely interpretation (i.e., the one with the highest probability of being correct). In contrast, the simplicity principle states that the visual system has a preference for the most simple interpretation (i.e., the one with the shortest description). The question of whether these seemingly very different principles really are different has deep roots in the history of science. For instance, William of Occam (ca. 1290 Occam (ca. -1349 promoted the view that the most simple interpretation of given data is most likely the best interpretation of these data, whereas Mach (1922 Mach ( /1959 suggested that simplicity and likelihood might be different sides of the same coin. In this article, I present a study of the history and meaning of the present-day perceptual notions of simplicity and likelihood and of the question of how close these notions actually are.
This study is primarily a theoretical study. Specific models are discussed only insofar as they illustrate the theoretical arguments which, as such, transcend the level of specific models. That is, this study aims at a better understanding of the finding that, empirically, concrete applications of the simplicity and likelihood prinThis research has been made possible by a grant from the Royal Netherlands Academy of Arts and Sciences.
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ciples often yield the same predictions. This finding resulted from the perceptual simplicity-likelihood debate in the 1980s and 1990s. Advocates of either principle presented phenomena that were claimed to be explained by one principle but not by the other principle---however, advocates of the other principle were generally able to counter such arguments (see, e.g., Boselie & Leeuwenberg's [1986] reaction to Rock, 1983, and to Pomerantz & Kubovy, 1986; Sutherland's [1988] reaction to Leeuwenberg & Boselie, 1988; reaction to Biederman, 1987) . For instance, the pattern in Figure 1A is readily interpreted as a parallelogram partly occluding the shape in Figure  1B , rather than the "arrow" in Figure 1C . The likelihood principle, on the one hand, could explain this as follows. The arrow interpretation implies that, in Figure 1A , edges and junctions of edges in one shape coincide proximally (i.e., at the retina) with edges and junctions of edges in the other shape. Such coincidences are unlikely, that is, they occur only if the distal (i.e., real) arrangement of the shapes, or the perceiver's viewpoint position, is very accidental. The interpretation in Figure 1B does not imply such coincidences and is therefore more likely (cf. Rock, 1983) . On the other hand, because the shape in Figure 1B is simpler than the arrow, the simplicity principle, too, could explain that the former is preferred (cf. Buffart, Leeuwenberg, & Restle, 1981) .
This example illustrates that the simplicity and likelihood principles may result in the same predictions, but by means of very different lines of reasoning which, moreover, put forward very different types of aspects as being decisive. That is, the likelihood account is an account in terms of positional coincidences and reflects a so-called probabilistic account of viewpoint-dependent aspects of perception. In contrast, the simplicity account is an account in terms of shape complexities and reflects a so-called descriptive account of viewpoint-independent aspects of perception. In this sense, a theoretical comparison of the two principles seems hardly possible: Not only are the types of account very different (i.e., probabilistic vs. descriptive) but they are also, at least in the example above, applied to very different aspects of perception (i.e., viewpoint-dependent vs. viewpoint-independent aspects). In this study, however, I show how the two principles can Figure 1 . The pattern in A is readily interpreted as a parallelogram partly occluding the shape in B, rather than the arrow in C. This preference could be claimed to occur either because, unlike the shape in B, the arrow would have to take a rather coincidental position to obtain the pattern in A or because the shape in B is simpler than the arrow. Probably, however, both aspects play a role.
yet be compared theoretically. Table 1 presents the general framework of this comparison, the details of which are specified in the course of this study.
The point is that, in the simplicity-likelihood debate, the actual controversies often seem to have been obscured by the lack of clear distinctions between viewpoint-dependent and viewpointindependent aspects of perception and between probabilistic and descriptive accounts of these two types of aspects. I analyze these distinctions in the historical context of the simplicity and likelihood paradigms, now and again using some reformulations that facilitate a theoretical comparison of the two paradigms. This analysis has been made possible by, among other things, very intriguing findings in the mathematical research area of algorithmic information theory (AIT). For a mathematical introduction to AIT, I refer to Li and Vitfinyi's (1997) book An Introduction to Kolmogorov Complexity and Its Applications, which has been my main guide into AIT. A1T is devoted largely to the question of how simplicity and likelihood are actually related, and fairly recent results in AIT suggest that simplicity and likelihood might well be very close (see also Vitfinyi & Li, 2000) . In this study, I elaborate on this insight from AIT to assess how close simplicity and likelihood are in perception.
I owe credit to Chater (1996) for drawing attention to AIT, even though his discussion of AIT findings is rather flawed (see the Appendix). Chater wrongly suggested that he settled the question of how close simplicity and likelihood are by claiming to have proved that the simplicity and likelihood principles are formally equivalent. At best, however, his article can be read as a halfhearted rejection of Pomerantz and Kubovy's (1986) proposal to redefine the simplicity principle in terms of the likelihood principle and as an unsupported approval of Leeuwenberg and Boselie's (1988) inverse proposal to redefine the likelihood principle in terms of the simplicity principle. In this study, I use AIT findings to put these two proposals in a new perspective by assessing, for each principle, how such a redefinition relates to its original definition.
This article consists of four fairly separate parts and a general discussion. In the relatively long first part, The Simplicity and Likelihood Principles in Perception, I discuss the development of the simplicity and likelihood principles in perception research, and I analyze the distinction between (and subsequent integration of) viewpoint-dependent and viewpoint-independent aspects of perception. In the second part, The Age of Information, I discuss the classical information-theoretic ideas about the relation between simplicity and likelihood, and I sketch how these ideas caused a paradigm shift from probabilistic to descriptive accounts in perception as well as in mathematics. In the third part, Structural Versus Algorithmic Information Theory, I go into more detail on the differences and parallels between perception and AIT to enable a proper appreciation of AIT findings. In the fourth part, The Relation Between Simplicity and Likelihood, I sketch how AIT research has led to deep mathematical insights into the relation between simplicity and likelihood. In the General Discussion, I argue that either principle may have guided the evolution of visual systems because, among other things, the two principles seem to be close with respect to the viewpoint-dependent aspects which are Hypotheses judged on Viewpoint-independent a s p e c t s Viewpoint-dependent aspects (distal stimulus as such) (relation to proximal stimulus) decisive in everyday perception. My overall conclusion is that the simplicity paradigm may provide perception models with the necessary quantitative specifications of the often plausible but also intuitive ideas provided by the likelihood paradigm.
The Simplicity and Likelihood Principles in Perception
Here, I review the development of the simplicity and likelihood principles in perception research. I focus on historical aspects that are directly relevant to the distinction between viewpoint independencies and viewpoint dependencies (for alternative or broader historical views, see, e.g., Gigerenzer & Murray, 1987; Gordon, 1997; Palmer, 1999; Pomerantz & Kubovy, 1986) .
The Likelihood Principle
The likelihood principle was initiated about one century ago by von Helmholtz (1909 Helmholtz ( /1962 . It states, more specifically than I sketched earlier, that "we perceive the most likely objects or events that would fit the sensory pattern that we are trying to interpret" (Hochberg, 1968, p. 89 ; for similar formulations, see, e.g., Gregory, 1973, and Pomerantz & Kubovy, 1986) . Perception is thus conceived as a neural activity the outcome of which can be modeled by a process of hypothesis testing, eventually selecting the most likely hypothesis. In other words, perception is modeled as selecting, for a given proximal stimulus, the interpretation with the highest probability of being correct, that is, with the highest probability of specifying the really present distal stimulus. Hence, in fact, the likelihood principle corresponds to the assumption that perception is as veridical as it can be.
In the following subsections, I review how likelihood approaches have addressed the question of, so to speak, where the perceptual system gets its probabilities from. I first discuss this briefly for viewpoint-independent aspects of perception and then more extensively for viewpoint-dependent aspects. Finally, I discuss how these two types of aspects may be integrated within the likelihood paradigm.
Viewpoint-independent aspects and prior probabilities. Traditional ideas, within the likelihood paradigm, are that the probability of an interpretation is higher if the interpretation reflects a situation that occurs more frequently in this world or if it is more familiar or biologically more important as reflected by ontogenetically or phylogenetically acquired knowledge--see, for example, Pomerantz and Kubovy (1986) , Gigerenzer and Murray (1987) , Gordon (1997) , and Palmer (1999) for more extensive discussions of such ideas by, for example, Ames (1949) , Brunswick (1956) , Hochberg (1968) , Neisser (1976) , Gregory (1980) , and Rock (1983) . It is difficult to assess whether the visual system is indeed guided by such real-world probabilities. To my knowledge, such real-world probabilities have never been really determined by, for instance, counting how frequently certain things occur in this world. Besides, what are the categories of things to be distinguished, and how are these categories distinguished? Is one category a specific object, or is it an object set of, for example, all cubes of a specific size, or is it a structure set of, for example, all cubes (disregarding size differences), or is it a property set of, for example, all symmetries in all objects?
Despite these questions, it is yet plausible that visual systems have somehow undergone an evolutionary adaptation to real-world probabilities.1 Be that as it may, note that these probabilities are typically attributes of distal stimuli. That is, these probabilities are already fixed prior to the actual presence of a proximal stimulus and are thereby independent of the viewpoint position of the perceiver. These viewpoint-independent probabilities are therefore also called prior probabilities. In this study, I refer to the idea of frequencies of occurrence as a pars pro toto for the aforementioned ideas about the real-world origin of these prior probabilities.
Viewpoint-dependent aspects and conditional probabilities.
More recent likelihood approaches by, for example, Rock (1983) , Pomerantz and Kubovy (1986) , Biederman (1987) , and Hoffman (1998) proposed heuristics that are useful for inferring likely interpretations from a given proximal stimulus. Many of these heuristics reflect so-called Gestalt laws of perceptual organization. Gestalt psychologists (K6hler, 1920; Wertheimer, 1923) proposed these laws as principles guiding the perceptual grouping of elements in a stimulus. Examples of these grouping principles are proximity, symmetry, similarity, and good continuation. The law of proximity, for instance, expresses that stimulus elements tend to be grouped together if they are relatively close to each other. I refer the reader to Pomerantz and Kubovy (1986) for an extensive discussion of this link between Gestalt psychology and the heuristics as used in the more recent likelihood approaches. My present point is that a lot of these heuristics deal with the viewpoint position of the perceiver.
For instance, in the introduction, I alluded to Rock's (1983) avoidance-of-coincidence heuristic, which excludes interpretations that imply an accidental viewpoint position with respect to shapes arranged in depth. In a similar vein, Binford (1981) , Witldn and Tenenbaum (1983) , and Biederman (1987) argued that a proximal straight line can safely be interpreted as a distal straight edge because it can be caused by a distal curved edge only from an accidental viewpoint position. They therefore referred to straightness-and also to, for example, symmetry--by the term nonaccidental property: If such a property is present in the proximal stimulus, then it is most likely also present in the distal stimulus.
These ideas reflect the general viewpoint assumption: A proximal stimulus is interpreted assuming it does not contain features that would arise only from an accidental viewpoint position with respect to the distal stimulus. In other words, the probability of the perceiver taking a general viewpoint position is a priori assumed to be high. The general viewpoint assumption is indeed plausible, but it seems better to formulate it in another way. That is, the probability of the perceiver taking a general viewpoint position is not one fixed probability but varies with the distal stimuli at hand. For instance, apart from orthofrontal rotations, a straight needle seems 1 This may also indicate that the likelihood principle is generally understood to imply that perceptual preferences are based on some form of long-term learning, rather than on a form of short-term learning. For instance, within the miniature world of a single experiment, one may first present a number of same and different views of an object and then test whether a subsequently presented view leads to faster recognition if it is closer to a previously more frequently presented view (cf. Tan', 1995) . Such short-term learning experiments, however, are about how preferred interpretations, in this case, of the previously presented views, might be represented in memory rather than about the currently relevant issue of how perception selects the interpretations it prefers.
to give rise to only two nongeneral viewpoint positions (i.e., those yielding a proximal dot), whereas a solid cube seems to give rise to at least six nongeneral viewpoint positions (i.e., those yielding a proximal square). Therefore, it seems better to formulate the general viewpoint assumption in terms of so-called conditional probabilities:
The conditional probability of an interpretation is the probability that the given proximal stimulus arises, conditional on the real distal stimulus being as hypothesized.
For instance, a distal straight edge yields proximally a straight line from almost any viewpoint position, so that the hypothesis that a proximal straight line is caused by a distal straight edge has a very high conditional probability. Analogously, the hypothesis that it is caused by a distal curved edge has a very low conditional probability. Conditional probabilities reflect the degree of consistency between a proximal stimulus and each of the candidate distal stimuli. Thereby, conditional probabilities account for viewpointdependent aspects of perception. Furthermore, this analysis shows that the general viewpoint assumption is plausible because it favors interpretations with high conditional probabilities (i.e., rather than because it gives the perceiver a high prior probability of taking a general viewpoint position).
In order to give a gist of how conditional probabilities may be determined, I consider the patterns in Figure 2 . Each of the six patterns A -F in Figure 2 can be interpreted as a rectangle plus a triangle. Under this interpretation, however, the patterns exhibit different numbers of coincidences in Rock's (1983) sense. For instance, Pattern A exhibits no coincidences, whereas Pattern B exhibits one coincidence, namely, an edge in the rectangle coincides with a junction of edges in the triangle. Similarly, each of the other patterns, too, can be seen as belonging to a specific coincidence class of relative positions. Assuming a restricted resolution, one may count how many relative positions of the rectangle and the triangle would fall in the same coincidence class. For each pattern and after normalization, this number of relative positions can then be taken as the conditional probability of the rectangle + triangle interpretation. Going from Pattern A to Pattern F, one thus finds that this conditional probability gradually decreases.
Of course, analogous to the previous subsection, pending questions here are which coincidence classes are to be distinguished, and how are they distinguished? After all, without presupposing such classes, all relative positions would be equally coincidental--only with such classes, the coincidentality of a relative position can be assessed on the basis of the size of its class (i.e., it is more coincidental if it belongs to a smaller class). Yet, intuitively, this method of determining conditional probabilities seems plausible, and, as a final example, it also implies that the nonpreferred arrow interpretation in Figure 1 has a relatively low conditional probability.
Integrating prior and conditional probabilities. The foregoing indicates that the traditional likelihood approaches tended to focus on the viewpoint-independent prior probabilities of interpretations, whereas the more recent likelihood approaches tended to focus on the viewpoint-dependent conditional probabilities of interpretations (see also Gigerenzer & Murray, 1987 , who used different wordings to stress the relevance of the same distinction between prior and conditional probabilities). In this subsection, I discuss how Bayes's rule can be used to integrate prior and conditional probabilities, even though the need for such an integration is perhaps not obvious. 21 use Bayes's rule because, on the one hand, the main arguments in this study are at a level that transcends the level of specific models, while on the other hand, the Bayesian integration is open to any desired specification of either component (see also Watanabe, 1969) . One might, for instance, choose the prior probabilities to be uniform so that the conditional probabilities become completely decisive (cf. Gigerenzer & Murray, 1987 )~ To provide a good insight into the interpJay of prior and conditional probabilities, I first illustrate Bayes's rule by means of a hypothetical AIDS test that seems reliable in that 90% of its results are correct (see Table 2 for the quantitative details).
For given data D to be explained, Bayes's rule states that the so-called posterior probability p(HID) of hypothesis H being true is proportional to the prior probability p(H) of H multiplied by the conditional probability p(D[I-1) of D given H. (The proportionality constant, or normalization, is presently 'less relevant--it comprises the probability p(D) that data D occur; see also Table 2 .) Now, for Figure 2 . Going from Pattern A to Pattern F, the triangle can intuitively be said to take a more and more coincidental position relative to the rectangle. This intuition presupposes certain categories of relative positions (so that an intuitively more coincidental relative position belongs to a smaller category) because, otherwise, all relative positions would be equally likely.
2 To be clear, an integration of prior and conditional probabilities is not in conflict with arguments that mental representations primarily comprise viewpoint-independent aspects (see, e.g., Biederman & Gerhardstein, 1993) nor with opposite arguments that they primarily comprise viewpointdependent aspects (see, e.g., Tarr, 1995) . That is, these arguments are about the character of already-stored mental representations (for an integration proposal regarding this memory issue, see Leeuwenberg & van der Helm, 2000) , whereas the present issue is about the criterion for the selection of interpretations still to be stored. Such a selection criterion does not prescribe which aspects of a selected interpretation will be stored in memory. , that is, 90% of subjects with AIDS score positive on this test, and 90% of subjects without AIDS score negative. For an individual subject who, for instance, scored positive, however, the question is how reliable this score is--after all, 10% of subjects without AIDS also score positive. The application of Bayes's rule shows that a negative score is indeed very reliable but also that a positive score is actually very unreliable due to the very low prior probability p(AIDS) = 2%. Suppose, for instance, that 1,000 arbitrary participants are to be tested. The prior probabilities imply that, among these 1,000 participants, there will be about 20 (i.e., 2%) with AIDS and about 980 (i.e., 98%) without AIDS. The conditional probabilities then imply that a positive score will result for about 18 (i.e., 90%) of the 20 participants with AIDS and for about 98 (i.e., 10%) of the 980 participants without AIDS. This means that by far, most of the positive scores, namely, 98 out of 116, will be false alarms, which corresponds to the Bayesian posterior probability p(--dlDSIPOS) = 84.5%.
The foregoing example shows that Bayes's rule provides an appropriate account of the interplay of prior and conditional probabilities. In perception, Bayes's rule can be used to characterize the likelihood principle as stating that the visual system, when presented with a proximal stimulus D, selects the interpretation H that maximizes (the normalization can now be omitted)
p(nlD) = p(H) X p(Oln).
(1) Hence, here, p(H) is the viewpoint-independent prior probability of interpretation H, whereas p(DIH) is the viewpoint-dependent conditional probability that proximal stimulus D arises if the distal stimulus is as hypothesized in interpretation H. The combination then yields the inferred posterior probability p(l~D) that H specifies the really present distal stimulus.
For instance, reconsider the heuristic that a proximal straight line is caused by a distal straight edge rather than by a distal curved edge. Pomerantz and Kubovy (1986, p. 13) argued that this heuristic should be justified by showing that, in this world, straight edges occur more frequently than curved edges (they also remarked that it remains to be seen whether this world complies with this requirement). This would be a justification in terms of prior probabilities only, whereas the heuristic actually derives its plausibility largely from the fact that the straight edge hypothesis has a high conditional probability (see previous subsection). Yet, in a sense, Pomerantz and Kubovy were correct because, as illustrated above for the AIDS test, a high conditional probability may well be suppressed by a low prior probability. That is, in the case of the straight edge hypothesis, the conditional probability is perhaps high, but this hardly affects Pomerantz and Kubovy's remark that it remains to be seen whether the prior probability is high enough to allow a probabilistic justification of the heuristic (Leeuwenberg et ai., 1994) .
The foregoing shows that the likelihood paradigm gives rise to an intuitively plausible model for the integration of viewpointindependent and viewpoint-dependent aspects of perception. Yet two modeling questions remain pending. First, for both types of aspects, it is as yet unclear how to distinguish between the categories to which probabilities are to be assigned. Second, without an actual quantification of the prior probabilities (if not taken to be uniform), it seems hardly possible to perform a critical test of the likelihood principle. Now, the remainder of this article shows, in fact, how the simplicity paradigm might provide answers to these questions. First, in the next section, I show that the simplicity paradigm gives rise to an alternative model for the integration of viewpoint-independent and viewpoint-dependent aspects.
The Simplicity Principle
In the previous section, I mentioned that the early 20th century Gestalt psychology influenced later developments within the likelihood paradigm. Gestalt psychology led, however, also to the simplicity principle, as follows. Koffka (1935 Koffka ( /1962 concluded that there might be one general principle underlying all of the Gestalt laws, and he called this principle the law of Pragnanz. Although the meaning of the German word Prtignanz is rather fuzzy (see Arnheim, 1987) , it is generally understood to imply something like a tendency towards stability, harmony, and simplicity. One might also understand it to imply that perception is conceived as a neural system that, when presented with a stimulus, exhibits the tendency of many other physical systems, that is, the tendency to settle into an equilibrium involving minimum energy load. The resulting neural pattern of activation then forms the mental representation of the stimulus interpretation. Be that as it may, Koffka's idea, combined with developments in classical information theory (see the second part of this article, The Age of Information), led Hochberg and McAlister (1953) to propose the simplicity principle, as follows: the less the amount of information needed to define a given organization as compared to the other alternatives, the more likely that the figure will be so perceived. (p. 361) (Hochberg & McAlister called it the minimum principle to indicate that perception tends to minimize information loads, in analogy to the tendency of physical systems to minimiz e energy loads.) At the same page, they specified information loads further, by the number of different items we must be given , in order to specify or reproduce a given pattern. (p. 361) This means, in other words, that perception is modeled as selecting the most simple interpretation of a given stimulus, where the complexity of an interpretation is defined by the amount of socalled descriptive information needed to specify the interpretation such that the stimulus can be reproduced (see also Attneave, 1954 , for an early theoretical discussion of this idea). 3
The simplicity principle can perhaps be seen as just another alternative within the likelihood paradigm, given that it can be conceived as stating that the probability of an interpretation is higher if the interpretation is simpler. Then, however, a crucial difference still would be that the likelihood principle, as it stands, can be said to infer the probability of an interpretation from an analysis of the world, whereas the simplicity principle infers this probability from an analysis of the interpretation itself. These options reflect different answers to the earlier mentioned question of, so to speak, where the perceptual system gets its probabilities from. In this respect, the simplicity principle pretends to be an alternative to the likelihood principle, rather than an alternative within the likelihood paradigm. Yet, either way, it raises the question of how the simplicity principle's probabilities would relate to the likelihood principle's probabilities. This question is addressed extensively in the fourth part, below, The Relation Between Simplicity and Likelihood. Until then, I focus on Hochberg and McAlister's (1953) basic idea that simplest descriptions might be used to predict stimulus interpretations.
During the past 4 decades, this idea has been implemented in various so-called perceptual coding languages (see, e.g., Dastani, 1998; Feldman, 1997; Leeuwenberg, 1969 Leeuwenberg, , 1971 Restle, 1970 Restle, , 1979 Restle, , 1982 Simon & Kotovsky, 1963; Vitz & Todd, 1969) . Such a perceptual coding language is in fact a descriptive coding language, that is, it can be used to describe any arbitrary stimulus. Which specific stimulus descriptions (i.e., stimulus interpretations) are possible depends on which specific coding language is chosen-this issue is addressed in the third part, Structural Versus Algorithmic Information Theory. Here, I focus on the use of descriptive coding languages in general.
Basically, a coding language is a scientist's tool for obtaining complexities--just as, within the likelihood paradigm, counting would be a method of obtaining probabilities in terms of frequencies of occurrence. However, coding languages also incorporate much of the philosophy behind the simplicity paradigm. Therefore, in the next subsection, I elaborate on the character and potential relevance of descriptive coding languages (without singling out a specific coding language), and I discuss mathematical and psychological evidence that complexities are fairly independent of the chosen coding language. After that, I discuss how, within the simplicity paradigm, viewpoint-independent and-viewpointdependent aspects of perception have been dealt with.
Descriptive coding languages and the lnvariance Theorem.
Probably not by chance, the first perceptual coding languages were developed in the early days of the computer age. Indeed, as I assess first, perceptual coding languages have a lot in common with computer programming languages such as FORTRAN and PASCAL. A computer programming language comprises a set of instruction rules enabling a programmer to compile a code that, when run on a computer, produces certain output. In other words, the computer code represents a way to obtain this output. Similarly, a perceptual coding language comprises a set of coding rules enabling the compilation of a code that represents a way to construct a certain pattern. For instance, for a parallelogram with sidesy = 5 cm, z = 3 cm, and angles a = 70 ° , /3 = 110% a perceptual code could be something like 2 * (yotz/3). This code can be seen as an instruction to be executed by a plotter, in which case it would yield a drawing of the parallelogram. If it so happens that, for example, y = z = 3 cm and tx =/3 = 90 °, this same code 2 * (yotz/3) would produce a square--then, an alternative code is of course also something like 4 * (yot). Thus, basically, both computer codes and perceptual codes are so-called descriptive codes, that is, codes that constitute reconstruction recipes.
Another common characteristic of computer codes and perceptual codes is their so-called hierarchical structure (see also Simon, 1972) . For instance, the two computer codes given above for the letter sequence ababab.., abab reflect descriptions at the level of letters. However, so that, for example, a laser printer can put the letter a on paper (as instructed by the statement "print(a)"), somewhere down the line the laser printer has to be fed with a description of the letter a at the level of laser-printer pixels. Similarly, a perceptual code of the pattern '.. ".. '.. '.. "-. ".. could comprise a description like 6 * (t) at the level of dot-triples but only if t refers to a description like 3 * (d) at the level of dots, in which, in turn, d refers to a description of a dot at the level of, say, perceptual pixels. Thus, a descriptive code comprises in fact a hierarchy of description levels in which, recursively, each level involves a description that builds on its lower levels.
3 The simplicity principle has sometimes been associated with simplicity in terms of the processing efficiency (regarding, e.g., speed or number of steps) or the hardware reliability of the visual system (cf. Hatfield & Epstein, 1985) . This kind of simplicity is perhaps relevant but is not considered in this study. Instead, I consider Hochberg and McAlister's (1953) kind of simplicity, which, just as likelihood, applies to the outcomes of the visual process. In the fourth part, The Relation Between Simplicity and Likelihood, the latter kind of simplicity is discussed in terms of efficiency and reliability but, then, regarding the required short-term memory capacity and the real-world veridicality of predictions, respectively.
The foregoing implies that different descriptive codes of one and the same object (i.e., certain computer output or a visual pattern) may specify, for this object, different classifications and different hierarchical organizations (see also Figure 3 ). For instance, as indicated, the perceptual codes 4 * (ya) and 2 * (yaz/3) both may produce the same square, that is, when supplied with the proper numerical values of the symbols. Then, in fact, the former code specifies a quadrangle consisting of four identical sides and four identical angles (which can be nothing but a square), whereas the latter code specifies a quadrangle in which opposite sides and angles are identical (which is the definition of a parallelogram). In other words, the former code classifies the square as square, whereas the latter code classifies the square as parallelogram. Furthermore, for the letter sequence ababab.., abab, the first computer code above describes the sequence as having a hierarchical organization consisting of 150 chunks abab, whereas the second computer code above describes it as having a hierarchical organization consisting of 300 chunks ab. In the theory of computer languages, classification and hierarchy do not seem to be major issues as such, that is, they seem to be conceived primarily as means to obtain compact codes of objects. In the theory of perceptual languages, however, classification and hierarchy are considered to have an intrinsic relevance, too, in that they might reflect the categories that play a role in perception. The classification issue is discussed more extensively in the third part, Structural Versus Algorithmic Information Theory. Here, it seems expedient to go into some more detail on three aspects of the hierarchy issue.
First, the hierarchical structure of descriptive codes allows for the simultaneous description of different features not only at a same hierarchical level but also at different hierarchical levels. In the latter case, the features are related asymmetrically. For instance, a circular pattern built up from small squares exhibits a hierarchy of the features circle and square, which is the inverse of the hierarchy exhibited by a square pattern built up from small circles (see also Leenwenberg & van der Helm, 1991) . The hierarchical structure of descriptive codes might well be helpful in solving the classical Gestalt problem of how to capture the interplay of competing Gestalt laws in a given pattern: Gestalt laws /? Figure 3 . The pattern in A can be described in various ways, each description reflecting another organization of the pattern. It can, for instance, be described and organized as consisting of two triangles (B), two diabolos (C), or two parallelograms (D). (After Reed, 1974.) apply to separate features, but simultaneously present features may have different effects in different patterns. Some of these differential effects might be captured by the asymmetry between hierarchical levels in descriptive codes (cf. Neisser, 1967) .
Second, Pascal (1658 Pascal ( /1950 observed that a description hierarchy seems to comprise an infinite number of semantically related nominalistic levels of description. That is, each hierarchical level contains symbols which are meaningful only in relation to the lower levels which describe what these symbols stand for. This holds of course also for the lower levels, so that the total number of levels seems to be infinite--at least, it is unclear what the lowest level might be. In computer theory, this problem has been solved by taking as the lowest level the level of binary sequences into which any higher level instruction is translated before it is executed. In perception theory, Pascal's problem reappears as the so far unsolved question of what the so-called perceptual primitives are: Are they pixels, dots, edges, blobs, or what? Biederman (1987) , for instance, proposed to solve this question by using a restricted set of prechosen primitives called geons (simple volumetric building blocks). Pragmatically, this is perhaps a convenient solution, but, theoretically, it is not very satisfactory (Kurbat, 1994; Leeuwenberg et al., 1994) . Within the simplicity paradigm, the idea is that perception starts with considering all possible primitives and that those leading to the simplest descriptive code will be the perceptual primitives for the stimulus at hand (see also Palmer & Rock, 1994 , for a similar fluid notion of primitives).
Third, in practice, users of a descriptive coding language generally work with only the highest levels in the description hierarchy, meaning that the topic under investigation is assumed to be tractable without having to bother about lower level details. The choice to start the encoding at some level is not a choice between languages (as suggested by, e.g., Chater, 1996) , but it is a choice within a language. If, for instance, perceptual research on dot patterns is at hand, then it may be reasonable to work with codes starting at the level of the dots--unless, for example, the dots have varying shapes or colors, in which case one may have to start at a lower level to get a proper account of the perceptual variation within the stimulus set at hand. In other words, it seems reasonable to start the encoding at the level just below the level at which the stimuli start to show distinctive properties. Similar considerations apply to the practice of computer programming: Usually, it suffices to program in terms of higher level instructions, without having to bother about how these instructions are implemented at lower levels. Now, the entire simplicity paradigm actually leans on the fact that different descriptive codes of the same object not only specify different classifications and organizations but, generally, also have different lengths (with, as may be clear, a special status for the shortest one). This, too, is illustrated by the two computer codes for the letter sequence ababab.., abab and by the two perceptual codes for a square (assuming that these highest description levels are representative for the entire description hierarchy). These examples also illustrate that the length of a descriptive code depends on the amount of regularity accounted for (see also Simon, 1972) . That is, in general, shorter descriptive codes of an object are obtained by "squeezing out" more regularity. Thus, descriptive coding languages establish a link between what Hatfield and Epstein (1985) called descriptive simplicity (in terms of code compactness) and phenomenal simplicity (in terms of regularity).
There is much more to say about descriptive code lengths (see the third and fourth parts, below), but for the moment, it may suffice to note that these lengths correspond quite well to Hochberg and McAlister's (1953) notion of complexity as being "the number of items we must be given" (p. 361).
The foregoing suggests that the simplicity paradigm can be seen as a scientific enterprise that, at one stroke, might solve the two questions that remained pending for the likelihood paradigm. That is, first, descriptive codes might specify the perceptual categories to which probabilities are to be assigned, and, second, the complexities of these codes might be used to quantify these probabilities. Thus, the simplicity paradigm might provide a quantitative specification of the intuitive notions provided by the likelihood paradigm. This is the enterprise Hochberg and McAlister (1953) more or less proposed and that has been explicitly promoted by Leeuwenberg and Boselie (1988) . By the way, once the perceptual categories have been specified by means of descriptive codes, one could of course still decide to search for their real-world probabilities. However, descriptive codes, regularity, and simplicity form a strong trinity, so that it seems expedient to at least consider the option of using complexities to quantify probabilities. This option might be fruitful especially in situations like perception where one does not have direct access to the real probabilities. In mathematics, Solomonoff (1964a Solomonoff ( , 1964b ) explicitly had such situations in mind when he proposed to undertake the very same scientific enterprise (see the fourth part, The Relation Between Simplicity and Likelihood). Solomonoff (1964a Solomonoff ( , 1964b ) not only was interested in the possibility of a useful relation between complexities and probabilities (rather than in the categorization issue) but also solved a problem that seemed to nip the entire enterprise in the bud. That is, if one defines the complexity of an object by the length of its shortest description, then different descriptive coding languages generally yield different complexities for one and the same object. Hence, it seems impossible to speak of "the" complexity of an object. Thus, the question is: Which descriptive coding language should be used? Solomonoff, however, showed that it does not matter much which descriptive coding language is used because the complexity of an object cannot vary arbitrarily over descriptive coding languages.
More formally, two languages L 1 and L 2 may yield different complexities Cl(x) and C2(x) for the same object x, but Solomonoff (1964a Solomonoff ( , 1964b proved that the absolute difference IC2(x) -Cl(x) I is smaller than some constant that depends on only the two languages (i.e., not on the object). To give a gist in terms of computer languages, let Cr. P be the length of the shortest PASCAL code that translates any FORTRAN code into its equivalent in PASCAL, and let x be the output to be produced. Now, if CF(X) is the length of a shortest FORTRAN code of x, then one can write a PASCAL code that consists of this shortest FORTRAN code of size CF(X) plus the translator code of size CF. P. This PASCAL code first translates the FORTRAN code into PASCAL and then executes this translation to produce x. Often, there will be even shorter PASCAL codes for producing x, so, in general, the complexity Cp(x) in PASCAL will be smaller than or equal to CF(X) + CF.p, in which the constant Cr. r, depends on only the two languages. One may still debate the precise size of the constant, but, in general, Solomonoff's finding implies that different descriptive coding languages yield object complexities that are fairly close to one another. In other words, it implies that simplicity is a fairly stable concept and that, to a high degree, it is yet possible to speak of "the" complexity of an object.
Solomonoff's fmding, known as the lnvariance Theorem, marked the beginning of AIT as a separate mathematical research area. Independently, this theorem has been proved too by the other two founding fathers of AIT, Kolmogorov (1965) and Chaitin (1969) . Also independently, Simon (1972) observed this invariance in perception. Simon compared six perceptual coding languages from the literature and found that their quantifications of complexity are highly correlated. Simon's finding can be seen as an empirical proof that the Invariance Theorem is valid in perception. Simon also remarked, however, that this invariance does not pertain to the categorization issue, that is, different sets of coding rules yield different categories. Hence, a psychological foundation of the employed coding rules remains necessary (for this, see the third part, Structural Versus Algorithmic Information Theory). The foregoing shows that, at least regarding the quantification of complexity, it does not seem to matter much which perceptual coding language one chooses to use. Therefore, in this study, I
choose one perceptual coding language as a pars pro toto, namely, Leeuwenberg's (1969 Leeuwenberg's ( , 1971 coding model which became known as the structural information theory (SIT). An obvious reason for me to choose SIT is my own involvement in the SIT research group at the University of Nijmegen--but there is more to say about this choice. SIT has faced several problems regarding, for instance, the choice of its coding rules and its complexity measurement and the computability of its simplest codes--see, for example, Simon (1972) , Collard and Buffart (1983) , Hatfield and Epstein (1985) , and Pomerantz and Kubovy (1986) . These problems, however, have largely been overcome (see also the third part, below). Despite various remaining problems (which keep the research group going), SIT is nowadays probably the most elaborated coding approach in perception (as this study may be proof of; see also, e.g., Palmer, 1999) .
Analogous to the earlier discussed likelihood approaches, SIT conceives perception as a neural activity the outcome of which can be modeled by a process of hypotheses testing--but now selecting the most simple hypothesis. Also analogously, SIT started out focusing primarily on viewpoint-independent aspects of perception. Later, SIT began considering viewpoint-dependent aspects, albeit actually to argue that these aspects are subordinate to viewpoint-independent aspects (Buffart, Leeuwenberg, & Restle, 1983; Leeuwenberg & Boselie, 1988; Leeuwenberg et al., 1994) . More recently, however, SIT has included viewpoint-dependent aspects as a separate factor that is to be integrated with viewpointindependent aspects (van Lier, van der Helm, & Leeuwenberg, , 1995 . This integrative approach is discussed next.
Viewpoint-independent aspects and prior complexities. Analogous to the notion of prior probability, one may define the prior complexity of a stimulus interpretation as the complexity of the distal shapes as hypothesized in this interpretation, independent of the actual proximal stimulus: Thus, as before, this complexity is already fixed prior to the actual presence of a proximal stimulus and is thereby independent of the viewpoint position of the perceiver. For instance, Figures 1B and 1C depict two interpretations of the pattern in Figure 1A , each interpretation specifying a distal shape that is hypothesized to be the one that is partly occluded by the parallelogram. The prior complexity of each interpretation then amounts to the sum of the complexity of the parallelogram and the complexity of this hypothesized shape. Because the shape in Figure 1B has a simpler code than the arrow in Figure 1C , its corresponding interpretation has a lower prior complexity. Similarly, for a proximal straight line, the straight edge hypothesis has a lower prior complexity than the curved edge hypothesis. This picture of prior complexities touches two currently relevant issues.
First, it could be argued that a simple form is, in an evolutionary sense, more prone to leave a strong neural trace because, for example, it can be stored succinctly and retrieved quickly, which could imply a high prior probability. This argument might even fit in the likelihood paradigm (cf. Pomerantz & Kubovy, 1986, p. 10) . However, as indicated earlier, this study is meant to assess whether the simplicity paradigm might be an alternative to, rather than within, the likelihood paradigm. Now, in the likelihood paradigm, prior probabilities are based on, for example, frequencies of occurrence in this world, and there seems to be no reason to assume that these might somehow correspond quantitatively to prior complexities. This can be seen as an indication that the simplicity and likelihood principles are not particularly close--at least not with respect to the viewpoint-independent aspects of perception.
Second, within the likelihood paradigm, an explicit specification of the perceptually relevant categories has to precede the determination of the prior probability for an individual case. In contrast, as discussed by Collard and Buffart (1983) , within the simplicity paradigm, each descriptive code implicitly induces a category (in the spirit of Garner's [1962] so-called inferred subsets; see the third part, Structural Versus Algorithmic Information Theory). For instance, the simplest code of a specific square implicitly induces the category of all possible squares. Thus, now, the categories in fact succeed the determination of the prior complexity for an individual case. This suggests that the order of determination might be as follows: first the prior complexity, then the category, and only then the prior probability. Be that as it may, the foregoing indicates that the categories might well be crucial in assessing how close prior complexities and prior probabilities are (see the third and fourth parts, below).
Viewpoint-dependent aspects and conditional complexities. In the previous section, I discussed how viewpoint-dependent aspects are dealt with, in an intuitively plausible way, by the general viewpoint assumption. I argued that, within the likelihood paradigm, the general viewpoint assumption is best formalized in terms of conditional probabilities, although, even then, there is still the problem of distinguishing between the categories to which these probabilities are to be assigned. Within the simplicity paradigm, however, the general viewpoint assumption can be formalized without the need for explicit a priori categories. This has been shown by van Lier (van Lier et al., 1994) , whose line of reasoning I sketch next.
Van Lier argued that coincidences, in the sense of Rock (1983) , are in fact regularities in the relative position of the shapes in an interpretation (see, e.g., Figure 2 ). Regularity constitutes a perceptual binding force, that is, in this case, proximally coinciding pattern elements tend to be glued together perceptually (this looks like a genuine Gestaltlike grouping principle). This perceptual glue, however, may contrast with an interpretation in which these pattern elements are specified as belonging to different objects. Therefore, van Lier argued, the effort needed to perceptually dissociate such coincidentally glued elements in fact reflects the complexity of the relative position of the hypothesized objects in the proximal stimulus. Inversely, one could say that this complexity corresponds to the effort needed to bring the hypothesized objects in their proximal position, starting from a general position of these objects (i.e., a position for which the perceiver can be said to be in a general viewpoint position).
The way in which van Lier quantified this complexity, which he called Ioxtern,d, may be illustrated by means of the four patterns in Figure 4 . Each of these four patterns can be interpreted as a configuration consisting of one long line segment plus one short line segment (like two sticks thrown on the floor). Figure 4A depicts the two segments in a general, that is, dissociated, position, whereas the other three patterns depict proximal positions in which the two segments are perceptually glued together. Now, van Lier first used SIT's coding model to specify the complexity of each of the four patterns when described as consisting of two segments (see Figure 4) . Then, for each of the three proximal positions, he quantified its Iext~ma 1 by the complexity difference between the general position and the proximal position (see Figure 4 ). In line with this, if the proximal position happens to be the general position, it gets an l~xt~m~a = 0 (see Figure 4A ). Going from left to right in Figure 4 , one thus finds a gradual increase of the l~xt~r~ ~ for the two segments interpretation. Van Lier also generalized this idea to quantify the complexity of the relative position of twodimensional shapes as hypothesized in interpretations of twodimensional occlusion patterns like the pattern in Figure 1A . For details about this generalization, I refer to van Lier et al. (1994) , but just to give a gist: In Figure 2 , it implies that, going from Pattern A to Pattern F, one finds a gradual increase of the lext~m~ for the rectangle + triangle interpretation. As a final example, it implies that, in Figure 1 The foregoing indicates that an Iext~m~ a value is related to one specific interpretation of a given stimulus, that is, other interpretations of this stimulus generally have different lext~m~ a values. In fact, because Iext=.=~ a quantifies the difference between proximal and general positions, it can be seen as measuring the degree of consistency between a given proximal stimulus and each of the candidate distal stimuli. In other words, l~xter~ accounts for viewpoint-dependent aspects (van Lier, 1999) . In analogy to the notion of conditional probability, I therefore refer to the l~xt~m~a of a hypothesis as the conditional complexity of this hypothesis. 4
Furthermore, one may have noticed already that the patterns in both Figure 2 and Figure 4 show a gradual increase not only of the conditional complexity but also of the number of coincidences (in Rock's [1983] sense) that one might count intuitively. In other words, the conditional complexity of a hypothesis seems to be inversely correlated to its intuitively estimated conditional probability. This can be seen as an indication that the simplicity and likelihood principles might be close--at least with respect to the viewpoint-dependent aspects of perception.
Finally, van Lier determined conditional complexities without specifying position categories (at the most, perhaps only something like a general viewpoint category). This may indicate that what I stated about the categorization issue in relation to the prior complexities (see previous subsection) pertains just as well to the conditional complexities (see also the third part, below).
Integrating prior and conditional complexities. Buffart et al.'s (1981 Buffart et al.'s ( , 1983 attempt, within SIT, to show that the proximal positions of hypothesized shapes are relevant only in the case of otherwise ambiguous patterns turned out to be unsatisfactory (see, e.g., Boselie, 1988; Boselie & Wouterlood, 1989; Kanizsa, 1985; Kanizsa & Gerbino, 1982) . Van Lier et al. (1994) , however, realized that the viewpoint-dependent conditional complexity of an interpretation can and should be included as a factor separate from its viewpoint-independent prior complexity. They chose to hategrate prior and conditional complexities by simply summing them (see also van Lier, 2000) because this turned out to be sufficient to explain 95% of empirical data they gathered from the literature (most of which contradicted earlier SIT predictions). This integration proposal was developed independently of what turned out to be a parallel proposal in AIT. That is, strengthened by several intriguing AIT findings (see the fourth part, below), Rissanen (1978) proposed the minimum description length (MDL) principle:
The best hypothesis to explain given data is the one that minimizes the sum of (a) the information needed to describe the hypothesis; and (b) the information needed to describe the data with the help of the hypothesis.
Hence, in this definition, the first amount of information is the prior complexity (given by the shortest description of the hypothesis as such), and the second amount of information is the conditional complexity (given by the shortest description of the data, starting from the hypothesis).
Various incarnations of the MDL principle are nowadays being used for prediction in a wide range of statistical problems, among others in molecular biology (see Li & Vit~ayi, 1997, p. 376) and cognitive science (see, e.g., Myung, 2000; Myung & Pitt, 1997) . The MDL principle can in fact be seen as a modern version of Occam's razor: A description of raw data as such explains nothing, and it is better to search for some underlying hypothesis by means of which the data can be described more succinctly. The best hypothesis then is as specified by the MDL principle. This Occamian reasoning, by the way, also indicates that a simple summarion of prior and conditional complexities is the proper way to integrate them, just as Bayes showed that a simple multiplication is the proper way to integrate prior and conditional probabilities.
The MDL principle in AIT complies with van Lier et al.'s (1994) integrative approach in perception. It gives a formal characterization of the simplicity principle as stating that the visual system, when presented with a proximal stimulus D, seiects the interpretation H that minimizes
I(HID) = I(H) + I(DIH).
(2) Hence, here, I(HID ) is the so-called posterior complexity of interpretation H given proximal stimulus D. This complexity is given by the sum of the viewpoint-independent prior complexity I(H) of the distal shapes as hypothesized in H and the viewpointdependent conditional complexity I(DIH) of proximal stimulus D starting from these hypothesized distal shapes.
A few examples may illustrate that perceptual preferences indeed seem to be determined by an integrated interplay of the viewpoint-independent prior complexities and the viewpointdependent conditional complexities. First, in Figure 1 , the prior and conditional complexities converge in the sense that they both lead to the more simple shape in Figure IB being preferred over the more coincidental arrow in Figure 1C . Second, relative to the pattern in Figure 5B , the pattern in Figure 5A is more prone to be interpreted as a rectangle partly occluding a simple octagon. In Figure 5B , a more complex shape tends to be preferred because the octagon would have to take a coincidental position which implies a high conditional complexity.
Discussion
On the one hand, it is indeed likely that perception is guided by both viewpoint-independent and viewpoint-dependent aspects. On the other hand, it is rather unlikely that the neural perception process explicitly uses either complexities or probabilities to process these aspects. In this sense, the perceptual simplicity and likelihood principles are only suited to model the outcome of the neural perception process, which itself remains what I would call "automagic" (i.e., automatic in some still mysterious way). Indeed, both principles conceive perception as a neural activity the outcome of which can be modeled by a process of hypotheses testing, eventually selecting the most simple or most likely hypothesis. This of course raises the questions of how perception might generate the hypotheses to be tested and how perception might be 41 will not elaborate on the fact that there may be additional viewpointdependent aspects to be accounted for. In occlusion patterns, such an aspect is, for instance, the degree to which a shape is occluded. This aspect seems especially relevant in the case of self-occlusion of three-dimensional objects, for which van Lier currently generalizes his ideas. In his twodimensional occlusion study, van Lier accounted for this aspect by quantifying the complexity of only the occluded part--the sum of this complexity and I,,~t~-~a then forms the total conditional complexity. Figure 5 . Both patterns are readily interpreted as a rectangle partly occluding another shape. In both patterns, this occluded shape could be an octagon. This octagon interpretation, however, is stronger in Pattern A than in Pattern B because, in Pattern B, the octagon would have to take a rather coincidental position. Therefore, in Pattern B, the occluded shape is more readily taken to be a more complex shape. From "Competing global and local completions in visual occlusion," by R. J. van Lier, P. A. van der Helm, and E. L. J. Leeuwenberg, 1995, Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and Performance, 21, p. 580 . Copyright 1995 by the American Psychological Association. Adapted by permission of the author. (After Kanizsa, 1985.) able to select a most simple or most likely hypothesis, given the fact that the total number of possible hypotheses is virtually infinite. These questions are, as such, the subject of so-called process models of perception, but, here, it seems useful to indicate briefly some links from the simplicity and likelihood paradigms to process models (see also the third part, below).
First, SIT has been linked to connectionistic network models (van der Helm, 1994; van der Vegt, Buffart, & van Leeuwen, 1989) and to models for the detection of visual regularities (van der Helm & Leeuwenberg, 1999) . Second, computer vision research uses various incarnations of the heuristics as focused on in the present-day likelihood approaches (see, e.g., Barrow & Tenenbaum, 1986 ). Indeed, these heuristics can be very useful in generating likely interpretations. For instance, in Figure 1A , the grey edges collide proximally at two places with a straight black edge; such so-called T junctions give a heuristic indication that the grey edges might belong to a partly occluded grey surface. The occluded part then would follow from the heuristic that a proximal straight edge is most likely caused by a distal straight edge plus the heuristic that a partly occluded edge that is straight as far as visible is likely to be straight too as far as not visible. This would imply, in Figure 1A , that the two visible grey edges are continued (behind the occluder) as straight edges until they meet, yielding the shape in Figure 1B (if they would not meet behind the occluder, then additional heuristics might be required).
Because, on the one hand, many of these heuristics deal with viewpoint dependencies, while on the other hand, conditional probabilities and complexities seem to be close, it is not surprising that many of these heuristics also fit in the simplicity paradigm, as follows. In general, interpretations with low conditional complexity are, for instance, those which, in line with the general viewpoint assumption, hypothesize that proximal stimulus properties are also present in the distal scene--then, no conditional effort is needed to describe these proximal structures. Furthermore, interpretations with low prior complexity are, for instance, those which extrapolate visible regularity to nonvisible parts (a form of good continuation; see also van Lier et al., 1995) . Often, one might thus very well end up with three-dimensional shapes comparable to what one would get when starting from Biederman's (1987) a priori fixed building blocks called geons. In this sense, Biederman's geon model would fit just as well within the simplicity paradigm as within the likelihood paradigm --the more because the likelihood paradigm, as it stands, hardly gives rise to heuristics leading to interpretations with a high prior realworld probability (i.e., with, e.g., a high frequency of occurrence in this world).
The latter issue touches what seems to reflect a fundamental difference between the simplicity and likelihood principles, namely, the specification of the part of cognition that either principle calls perception. For an extensive discussion of this issue, see Pylyshyn (1999) ; here, I merely sketch the nature of this difference between the two principles as follows. The priors (i.e., the viewpoint-independent aspects) are, in the likelihood paradigm, judged on the basis of some sort of (generally phylogenetic) knowledge, whereas, in the simplicity paradigm, they are judged independently of knowledge. Thus, the likelihood principle conceives perception as a nonmodular process that is open to influences from already stored knowledge. In contrast, the simplicity principle conceives perception as a modular process, the input of which is solely the proximal stimulus, and the output of which is taken over by higher cognitive processes to be enriched by means of already stored knowledge. This means that, with respect to the priors, there is little hope for a rapprochement of the two principles (even if, as has been proposed within the likelihood paradigm, the prior probabilities would be taken to be uniform).
With respect to the conditionals (i.e., the viewpoint-dependent aspects), there seems to be more hope for a rapprochement of the two principles. This can perhaps be understood, rather intuitively, as follows. In the simplicity paradigm, priors and conditionals are determined within the miniature world of a single stimulus. In the likelihood paradigm, conditionals are determined also within this miniature world, but priors are determined within the real world. Compared with the real world, the miniature world gives less room for quantitatively different options. This seems to imply that conditional complexities and probabilities cannot be as different from each other as can prior complexities and probabilities. Stated in a mixture of simplicity and likelihood terms, it might also imply that the real-worid probabilities could well be forming a rather complex probability distribution, whereas the miniature world probabilities are more prone to forming a rather simple probability distribution. In the fourth part, The Relation Between Simplicity and Likelihood, this intuitive argument is formulated in solid mathematical terms.
The latter remark already indicates that the remainder of this study is meant to provide further insight into the relation between the simplicity and likelihood principles but in a more formal way. That is, in this first part, I have used specific simplicity and likelihood models to illustrate the underlying ideas which, however, may sometimes still be obscured by the fact that such models will probably always be disputable. Therefore, in the remainder of this study, I investigate the perceptual simplicity-likelihood controversy at a more abstract level. That is, the likelihood principle is taken to start from probabilities given by some, not further specified, probability distribution, while the simplicity principle is taken to start from complexities obtained by means of some, not further specified, descriptive coding language. Furthermore, unless stated otherwise, the arguments apply to priors as well as, separately, to conditionals.
In order to give a gist of the line of reasoning in the remainder of this study, I conclude this part with a comparison of the two principles as formalized in Equations 1 and 2: Likelihood principle:
Select the H that maximizes p(I~D) = p(H) × p(DlI-1).
Simplicity principle:
Select the n that minimizes I(I~D) = 1(1-1) + I(DIH).
Considering just these formulas, one may observe that, by substituting I = -log2(p) for both the prior and conditional complexities, the simplicity principle becomes equivalent to the likelihood principle. Inversely, by substituting p = 2 -i for both the prior and conditional probabilities, the likelihood principle becomes equivalent to the simplicity principle. The former substitution complies with Pomerantz and Kubovy's (1986, p. 43) proposal to start from real-world probabilities p and to redefine the simplicity principle such that it uses codes the lengths of which are equal to the so-called surprisal I = -log2(p). The latter substitution complies with Leeuwenberg and Boselie's (1988) inverse proposal to start from descriptive-code complexities I and to redefine the likelihood principle such that it uses probabilities the size of what I call the precisal p = 2 -I. The proposals did not explicitly contain these formulas, but these formulas do express accurately what the proposals amount to. Furthermore, the terms surprisal and precisal are perhaps funny but, for the moment, also convenient references to those formulas--the concepts underlying these terms are explicated in the second and third parts, below, respectively. Chater (1996) mistook each of these equivalence-rendering redefinitions for a proof of the equivalence of the two principles as defined originally (see the Appendix). In Chater's first proof, the hidden assumption can be said to be that surprisals are equal to complexities (as determined by some descriptive coding language). In Chater's second proof, the hidden assumption can be said to be that precisals are equal to real-world probabilities (based on, e.g., frequencies of occurrence). The equivalence of the two principles, however, depends precisely on the correctness of these two assumptions--which Chater did not elaborate on. Now, the remainder of this study is actually largely about thes e two assumptions, that is, about how close surprisals and complexities are and about how close precisals and real-world probabilities are (see also Table 3 ).
In fact, the conceptual difference between precisals and realworld probabilities constitutes the perceptual simplicity-likelihood controversy considered in, say, certainty terms. That is, precisals and real-world probabilities reflect different answers to the ques- tion of how confident one can be about a given hypothesis. This issue is addressed in the third and fourth parts, below. The conceptual difference between surprisals and complexities also constitutes the perceptual simplicity-likelihood controversy but considered in information terms. That is, surprisals and complexities reflect different answers to the question of how much information one needs to specify a given hypothesis. This issue is addressed in the following part entitled The Age of Information, which sketches AIT's and SIT's common roots in classical information theory and which also illustrates that the simplicity and likelihood principles both are products of the age of information--albeit that the two principles reflect very different ideas about the concept of information.
The Age of Information
The mathematical research area of AIT, as well as the perceptual research area of SIT, came into being in the 1960s. Since then, these two research areas have been like parallel universes--they have shown similar theoretical developments, but there has been little interaction. A reason for the lack of interaction could be that these developments have occurred in different orders (reflecting different scientific strategies). For instance, as discussed above, AIT started with Solomonoff's (1964a Solomonoff's ( , 1964b Invariance Theorem, and only later did Rissanen (1978) propose the MDL principle. SIT, on the other hand, started from Hochberg and McAlister's (1953) simplicity principle, and only later did Simon 0972) assess that simplicity is a fairly stable concept. Another reason could be that AIT's mathematical character does not seem to comply well with SIT's perceptual character.
The latter issue is addressed in the third part, Structural Versus Algorithmic Information Theory, showing that a fruitful AIT-SIT interaction is yet possible. To lay the foundation of this interaction, I discuss here how the rise of both AIT and SIT was triggered by the same basic findings in classical (or selective) information theory. To this end, I adapt and update several historical notes from Garner (1962) , who gave an early account of the informationtheoretic roots of modern perception research (see also, e.g., Pomerantz & Kubovy, 1986) . First, I discuss the surprisal concept, which conjectures a logarithmic relation between simplicity and likelihood--this logarithmic relation pervades this entire study.
Then, I sketch how this concept led to Shannon's (1948) Noiseless Coding Theorem (see also Shannon & Weaver, 1949) , which, in the fourth part, turns out to be relevant to the visual short-term memory.
Classical Information Theory
It has become a commonplace to say that we are living in the information age, which, so far, has culminated in the idea that the world is becoming a global village shaped by worldwide computer networks. This is illustrated by the abolishment, in January 1999, of the Morse code in marine telegraphy--its task has been taken over by spoken language transmitted by means of satellites. The beginning of the information age can be situated mid 19th century, when modem communication techniques became available and Morse developed his code. With the rise of the information age came the need for a measure of information--not of the content of information, but of quantities of information. The practical reason for this need was that one wanted to be able to optimize the efficiency of information transmission, that is, to minimize the burden on transmission channels. This objective evoked theoretical questions about the fundamental nature of information. In the first half of the 20th century, various researchers, for example, Nyquist (1924 ), Harfley (1928 , Gabor (1946 ), Wiener (1948 ), and Shannon (1948 , studied these questions and laid the foundations of the present-day ideas about the relation between simplicity and likelihood. One of the first basic ideas was (Hartley, 1928; Nyquist, 1924) : Information is a commodity one obtains where there was first uncertainty. This idea led to the surprisal concept, as may be explicated in three steps, the first step being as follows.
If one is going to toss a two-headed coin, there is no uncertainty about the outcome of the toss (always heads), and one will get no information from the actual outcome. If one is going to toss a fair heads-and-tails coin, however, there is uncertainty about the outcome (either heads or tails), and one will get information from the actual outcome. In other words, getting information means reduction of uncertainty. Thus, the amount of information (say,/) obtained from an event can be defined by the amount of uncertainty (say, U) removed by the event. This uncertainty U depends on the total number (say, Z) of events that could result as outcomes of an activity: If there are more possible outcomes, there is more uncertainty about what the outcome will be, so that the actual outcome also removes more uncertainty. Nyquist (1924) and Hartley (1928) realized that the relation between I and U, on the one hand, and Z, on the other hand, should be logarithmic: x~. After all, in practical communication contexts, different messages generally do not have the same probability of being transmitted (just as, in perception, different interpretations of a stimulus generally do not have the same probability of being preferred). For such situations, Equation 4 might express an appropriate quantification of information in terms of probabilities. This quantification of so-called probabilistic information is also called the surprisal (as opposed to complexity as quantification of descriptive information; see Table 3 ). That is, in communication terms, the less likely a specific message is transmitted, the more surprised the receiver will be when this specific message is received. Now, as I discuss next, the surprisal is at the heart of Shannon's (1948) Noiseless Coding Theorem, which triggered the rise of both AIT and SIT.
Shannon's (1948) Noiseless Coding Theorem
Let X be a set of messages x; (i = 1, 2 ..... Z) with arbitrary but known probabilities p~ of being transmitted (so, ]~p; = 1). Furthermore, let the information in message x i be quantified by the surprisal l(xi) as given in Equation 4. Weighting l(xi) over the transmission probabilities p~ then gives the long-term average amount of information per transmitted message:
In general, I and U could be taken as proportional to log(Z), with a free-to-choose base number for the logarithm. Here, however, I follow the common practice of using logarithms to the base 2 and a proportionality constant of 1. This choice merely establishes the unit of measurement, that is, it has become customary to say that the amount of information obtained from an outcome is one bit (a contraction of binary digit) if there is only one alternative outcome possible. The rationale for the logarithmic character of the relation between I and Z can be illustrated as follows. When tossing three fair heads-and-tails coins, there are Z = 23 = 8 possible outcomes. If one tossed coin gives one bit of information, then it seems reasonable to require that each tossed coin gives one bit of information, yielding three bits for a three-coin toss. This is achieved by taking the logarithm of Z, so that the total information in a three-coin toss indeed is I = log2(Z) = log2(8) = 3 bits. The second step begins with the observation that, when tossing fair coins, the Z possible outcomes x~ (i = 1, 2 ..... Z) all have the same probability Pi = 1/Z of becoming the actual outcome. In such a simple case, the information l(x~) obtained from outcome x i can be quantified in terms of its probability Po by substituting Z = 1/pi in Equation 3. Then, one gets
which expresses that information I(x~) is equal to the negative logarithm of probability Pi. The third and final step then is to conjecture that Equation 4 can be used also when the probabilities pi are given by an arbitrary nonuniform probability distribution over the outcomes This Equation 5, too, reflects a quantification of probabilistic information, but now it concerns an average over many same and different transmitted messages. I(X) is also called the entropy of X, or the expected amount by which a transmitted message reduces the receiver's uncertainty. That is, I(X) is not necessarily the average number of bits per actually transmitted signal--this number-say, A(X)--depends on how messages are encoded into transmittable signals. Shannon (1948) focused on the relation between I(X) and A(X), and with his Noiseless Coding Theorem, he solved the practical question of finding a most efficient way to transmit messages. Shannon (1948) showed first, that I(X) is the theoretical lower bound for A(X) and second, that it is indeed possible to encode messages such that A(X) is minimal, that is, equal to this lower bound I(X). Such an encoding is therefore called an optimal encoding. An optimal encoding can be obtained by labeling each message xi with a transmittable code the length of the surprisal I(xi). Such an optimal label code, or surprisal code, could consist of, for example, l(x~) zeros and ones or I(xi) dots and dashes as in the Morse code. These label codes can then be transmitted, and the receiver is assumed to have a codebook in which can be found which message belongs to a transmitted label. Shannon's method implies that messages with higher transmission probabilities get logarithmically shorter labels. This method was used intuitively by Morse, who assigned logarithmically shorter dot-dash labels to more frequently used letters. For instance, in written English, about 1% of letters are Vs and about 10% are Es--in the Morse code, the V has a long label (dot-dot-dot-dash), and the E has a short label (dot). Morse apparently felt and, one century later, Shannon proved that this method yields an optimal encoding. 5
Discussion
The significance of Shannon's (1948) finding is that it showed that the surprisal, as quantification of probabilistic information, is not only a' nice theoretical concept but also a practically useful encoding concept. Thereby, Shannon's work constituted a breakthrough in information theory. It boosted mathematical research, leading eventually to the work of Solomonoff (1964a Solomonoff ( , 1964b , Kolmogorov (1965), and Chaltin (1969) . As mentioned, their work marked the beginning of AIT as a separate mathematical research domain. Furthermore, around 1950, psychologists felt that the underlying concepts of Shannon's work could be transferred usefully to perception--after all, in communication terms, perception can be conceived as transmitting information from the external world to the internal cognitive system. Soon after Shannon's work was published, it was introduced in psychology (Miller & Frick, 1949) , boosting psychological research as well (see Quastler, 1955 ).
Sharmon's probabilistic work led, in the 1950s, to psychological approaches in which empirical data were explained in terms of the frequencies of occurrence of stimuli in an experiment and in relation to the size of the entire set from which the stimuli were drawn (see, e.g., Fitts, Weinstein, Rappaport, Anderson, & Leonard, 1956 ). These approaches can be seen as using a restricted version of the likelihood principle, that is, restricted to the miniature world of a single experiment. The analogy with tossing coins and transmitting messages then is that the activity is the presentation of stimuli from a fixed stimulus set, during which each stimulus has a certain probability of being presented, that is, of becoming the outcome (see Table 4 ).
These 1950s approaches were perhaps more about learning than about perception (see also Footnote 1) and deviated from the original Helmholtzian likelihood principle to which, later, most likelihood-minded perception researchers returned--see, for example, Gregory (1973) , Rock (1983) , Pomerantz and Kubovy (1986 ), Biederman (1987 ), and Hoffman (1998 . As discussed in the first part, above, the original likelihood principle starts from real-world probabilities that, moreover, are not conceived as attributes of stimuli as such but as attributes of interpretations of Instantiating a A specific (metrical) structure variant stimuli. This implies another analogy: The activity now is the processing of a stimulus, and each interpretation of this stimulus has a certain probability of becoming the outcome (see Table 4 ). Shannon's encoding work had a more profound impact. Also taking place in the 1950s, it led researchers (e.g., Hochberg & McAlister, 1953) to rethink the concept of information, which resulted in a paradigm shift from probabilistic information to descriptive information. Whereas probabilistic information is about quantities of information only, descriptive information is about the content of information as well. This paradigm shift seems to have been triggered by the desire to repeat Shannon's work but without having to know the probability distribution. After all, in many situations (such as perception research and maybe perception itself), there is no direct access to the probabilities. Be that as it may, this paradigm shift led, in the 1960s, to the rise of SIT and similar descriptive coding models in perception and to the rise of AIT in mathematics.
The nature of this paradigm shift is reflected by the differences between probabilistic surprisal codes and simplest descriptive codes rather than by the effects of using either type of codes (see also Table 5 ). That is, as I elaborate further in the fourth part The Relation Between Simplicity and Likelihood, below, both types of codes yield a form of optimal encoding and a form of veridicality. These comparable effects, however, should not obscure the fundamental differences between the two types of codes, which I summarize next.
Basically, descriptive codes are information carders (just as, e.g., the pulse-wise firing patterns of neurons), whereas surprisal codes are merely labels referring to information stored elsewhere (e.g., in a codebook). More specifically, a descriptive code pinpoints a message by specifying its content (e.g., a perceptual organization; see Figure 3 ), whereas a surprisal code pinpoints a message only by means of a label that allows its content to be retrieved elsewhere (just as the word triangle is a label referring to the definition of triangles). This also indicates that a surprisal code comprises just one nominalistic level of specification, which is arbitrary in the sense that it is independent of the content of the specified message (see Figure 6 ). In contrast, a descriptive code comprises a hierarchy of several semantically related nominalistic levels (see The Simplicity and Likelihood Principles in Perception, above), that is, the structure within and between these levels is enforced by the content of a message. Finally, as implied by the Invariance Theorem, the lengths of descriptive codes (i.e., the complexities) are fairly independent of the employed coding language, whereas the lengths of surprisal codes are entirely dependent on the current probability distribution.
The foregoing illustrates that, in information terms, the simplicity-likelihood controversy boils down to the discrepancy between descriptive and probabilistic information, that is, between complexities and surprisals. For instance, Pomerantz and Kubovy (1986, p. 43) proposed that perceptual coding approaches like SIT 5 Note that the optimality of a label encoding is a function of the choice of the primitives over which the probability distribution is taken. For instance, a Morselike encoding of words instead of letters, based on word frequencies instead of letter frequencies, would yield another value of I(X), another encoding of entire sentences, and another total burden on the transmission channel--but it would also be an optimal encoding. Near optimal encoding in many worlds Fairy veridical in many worlds might start from the real-world probabilities of stimulus interpretations and then design descriptive codes with complexities equal to the respective surprisal values. However, apart from the earlier mentioned problem of an actual quantification of these probabilities, it seems hardly possible to design such descriptive codes. After all, the surprisal is entirely dependent on the current probability distribution, whereas, by the Invariance Theorem, all descriptive coding languages yield about the same complexities.
Pomerantz and Kubovy might argue, however, that van Lier et al. (1994) still seem to have followed their advice, at least with respect to the viewpoint-dependent aspects of stimulus interpretations. After all, as discussed above, van Lier et al. (1994) obtained conditional complexities that seem to be highly correlated to the surprisal values one might derive from conditional probabilities. This, however, requires some further qualification. On the one hand, it shows that there seems indeed to be some truth in Pomerantz and Kubovy's proposal. On the other hand, van Lier et al. (1994) perhaps could have obtained, but did not, conditional complexities by starting from conditional probabilities. That is, they did not apply the surprisal formula I = -log2(p). This, in fact, suggests an inversion: One might start from conditional complexities and then design conditional probabilities by applying the inverse formula p = 2 -/. This inverse formula yields what I already called the precisal and reflects the method by means of which both AIT and SIT proceeded to formulate a potentially meaningful relation between complexities and probabilities--be they priors or conditionals. The bottom part of Table 4 already Figure 6 . The horizontal axis represents a list of 32 arbitrary messages, ordered in some arbitrarily chosen way, for instance, by increasing importance or by decreasing frequency. Independent of the content of a message, log2(32) = 5 bits of information are needed to specify the position it happens to have in the list. This is illustrated here for the 13th message, the position of which is specified by the 5-bif label code 01101 (a binary representation of the decimal number 13). The five subsequent 0/1 bits specify recursively, in terms of left/right, in which half of (the remaining part of) the list the message is. 0 = left-hand half; 1 --right-hand half.
gives a hint about this method which, in the immediately following part, Structural Versus Algorithmic Information Theory, is explicated in the context of an overview of the differences and parallels between SIT and AIT.
Structural Versus Algorithmic Information Theory
In this part, I evaluate various differences between SIT and AIT. At first glance (see Table 6 ), these differences seem to obstruct an AIT-SIT interaction. Yet a basic parallel between SIT and AIT is that both research areas focus on the special status of simplest descriptive codes. Indeed, SIT and AIT may have been developed independently, but, in hindsight, SIT can be seen as a perceptiontailored version of the domain-independent AIT approach. Even so, SIT and AIT have given different answers to, first, the question of which descriptions are allowed and second, the question of how code complexity is to be measured. Hence, an evaluation of these answers is still needed to assess the extent to which an AIT-SIT interaction is possible. To this end, I first sketch AIT's answers, and then I elaborate on SIT's answers. After that, I discuss how AIT and SIT, respectively, formulated the precisal concept which relates complexities and probabilities in a way that, in the following part, turns out to be meaningful.
Algorithmic Descriptions and Complexities
The descriptions considered in AIT are binary sequences representing computer codes that, when run on a computer, produce objects as output. The complexity of such a code is, in AIT, defined by the syntactic length of the code, that is, by the number of bits in its binary representation. Thus, for instance, if a code is given by the binary sequence 10010110, then it has a complexity of 8 bits. Generally, many different codes may produce the same object, and the complexity of the simplest one is called the Kolmogorov complexity (K) of this object. More specifically, the simplest computer code among those that, without input, produce object x is said to yield the prior complexity K(x). Furthermore, the simplest computer code among those that, with input y, produce object x is said to yield the conditional complexity K(xly).
The foregoing gives a rough sketch of Kolmogorov complexity, which, in the present context, needs some further qualifications.
First, the employed computer is taken to be a so-called universal Turing machine (Turing, 1936 (Turing, , 1937 . Such a device manipulates a tape consisting of cells that each can contain a 0, a 1, or a blank. The device can perform only the basic operations of shifting the tape pointer one cell left or right and of changing the content of the current cell. The sequence of operations to be performed is given by a finite list of rules (i.e., the computer code). Because this device can imitate any modern computer (disregarding the currently irrelevant computing speed), its usage in tkIT means that the notion of Kolmogorov complexity is fairly machine independent.
Second, the prior complexities K(x), and, analogously, the conditional complexities K(xty), of objects x are in fact universal complexities, that is, complexities of simplest object descriptions in a so-called universal coding language. Such a language yields object complexities that are maximally a fixed constant larger than the object complexities--say, C(x)---in any other coding language.
That is, K(x) <--C(x) + c, where the positive constant c depends on this other language but not on the objects. The essence of the Invariance Theorem is that universal coding languages exist (one might think of computer languages like PASCAL or FORTRAN; see also the first part, above). The notion of Kolmogorov complexity is thereby also fairly language independent. Thus, in sum, the complexity K(x) of an object x is a theoretic construct and is close (equal up to a constant) to the complexity C(x) of x as measured by any concrete coding language.
These further qualifications indicate two practical loose ends. First, because AIT can rely on the language-independent notion of Kolmogorov complexity, AIT is hardly interested in developing concrete coding languages--this is left to specific application domains. Second, because K(x) exists only in theory, there is a computability problem--after all, in practice, a code is only as short as the smartest expert can get, so one can never be sure that, within a given coding language, a certain code is indeed the shortest one among the virtually infinite number of possible codes for a given object. To meet these loose ends, AIT has developed so-called randomness tests to assess whether a given code is about as short as possible. These tests start from the following idea. As discussed above in The Simplicity and Likelihood Principles in Perception, a descriptive code of an object is shorter if it squeezes out more regularity. Hence, the Kolmogorov complexity K(x) of an object xis given by a (binary) computer code that has squeezed out a maximal amount of regularity--not necessarily all regularity but as much as can be captured in one description (a descriptive code captures, by definition, only combinable regularities). Such a shortest code itself is in fact a random binary sequence--after all, if it still contained regularity, then this regularity could be squeezed out to get a still shorter code. Thus, one may assess whether a given code is about as short as possible by testing whether the code itself might be random (i.e., such a test has only a heuristic value and is not foolproof). In AIT, such tests are based on formal definitions of randomness, stating, for instance, that a binary sequence is probably random if it has hardly any identical subsequences of any reasonable length (see, e.g., Kolmogorov & Uspenskii, 1987 ).
AIT's focus on randomness does not seem very useful in perception. In fact, as I discuss in the next section, SIT has focused on the other end of the spectrum. That is, SIT has developed a formal definition of regularity to answer the question of which regularities should be squeezed out by a perceptual coding language. This is the question to be answered when designing a concrete perceptual coding language (see, e.g., Simon, 1972) . This contrasts with Pomerantz and Kubovy's (1986) proposal to design descriptive codes with lengths equal to surprisals---this proposal actually turns things upside down because, for a descriptive coding language, not lengths but descriptions are primary. Be that as it may, SIT's concrete coding language yields complexities that, by the foregoing, can be seen as approximations of the Kolmogorov complex-
ities K(x). This implies, inversely, that AIT proofs involving K(x)
perhaps cannot be taken as proof of, but at the least as evidence for, the relevance of simplest descriptive codes as considered in SIT.
How strong this evidence is, is a matter that codepends on how complexity is actually measured. That is, in the past, perceptual coding approaches, too, used to measure the complexity of a descriptive code in terms of something like its syntactic length. The psychological rationale was stated in terms of memory efficiency: A shorter code is more easily stored, requires less space, and is more easily retrieved. This memory aspect is perhaps convenient, but the syntactic length of a descriptive code does not seem to reflect a relevant aspect of perception itself. This problem has been discussed extensively in perception literature (see, e.g., Collard & Buffart, 1983; Hatfield & Epstein, 1985; Pomerantz & Kubovy, 1986; Simon, 1972; van der Helm, van Lier, & Leeuwenberg, 1992) . After the next section, I discuss SIT's solution to this problem.
Structural Descriptions
In AIT, the computability problem arises because, among other things, any imaginable kind of regularity in an object is allowed to be squeezed out to get shorter codes of the object. In perception, however, there seem to be so-called cognitive constraints, that is, constraints on what can be picked up by the visual system. For instance, the patten in Figure 7A is very easily seen to have a global mirror-symmetric structure, whereas the patten in Figure  7B does not seem to have any particular global structure. Yet the latter, too, has a very simple global structure (revealed in Figure 8 ) that, however, is apparently not perceptually accessible. In other words, let ll(AIT) be AIT's search space, that is, the set of all imaginable descriptions (i.e., stimulus interpretations) AIT would consider--then, it seems that perception has access to only a restricted part, say, I'~(vision). Hence, the scientific question is: Which constraints determine what ~(vision) is, and what do they imply for the computability problem in perception models?
A naive proposal would be that fl(vision) is determined merely by some sort of time constraint. This would imply that perception contents itself with the best interpretation in f~(AIT) it can get within the time it is given to search. Such a constraint would solve the computability problem in a rather drastic way: Computation simply ends when the limited search time has elapsed. It would, however, not be sufficient to explain the difference between Figures 7A and 7B: Both pattens contain the same number of identical dots, so that there can hardly be a computing time difference between the two global structures. In fact, this example suggests that f~(vision) is determined by more fundamental constraints: It seems that the visual system has access only to specific kinds of structures. This line of thought is explored next.
Within the likelihood paradigm, it could be argued that the perceptually accessible structures are determined by real-world probabilities that have been evolutionary installed into the visual system. The fact that perception seems to search in only a specific part of f~(AIT) is thus considered to be a consequence of the real-world probabilities. This sounds plausible, but it does not yet specify which concrete structures are perceptually accessible be-,a, B Figure 7 . The pattern in A is very easily seen to have a global mirror-symmetric structure. The pattern in B
does not seem to have any particular global structure--at least, not a global structure that is perceptually accessible (see also Figure 8 ).
cause, among other things, a concrete quantification of real-word probabilities is lacking. It also implies that the perceptual search is, in principle, allowed to run through the entire search space fl(AIT)--certain parts of I)(AIT) just happen to have very low probability and are, therefore, virtually never arrived at. This contrasts with SIT's starting point that the perceptual search is confined to an a priori fixed part of f~(AIT), that is, a part specified by constraints that precede considerations about probabilities or ----0 m• D Figure 8 . The pattern has a simple global structure, comprising a rectangular spiral along which the dots are equidistant. If the spiral is removed, however, then the resulting dot pattern (see Figure 7B ) no longer seems to have a perceptually accessible global structure.
complexities. In the remainder of this section, I discuss these constraints. SIT and similar visual coding approaches describe stimulus interpretations by means of certain coding rules that each squeeze out a specific kind of regularity (e.g., repetition or bilateral symmetry). The lack of, and, for example, Simon's (1972) call for, a formal criterion to justify the choice of coding rules evoked questions about the fundamental nature of regularity. That is, a formal criterion, which specifies the perceptually relevant regularities, would specify the coding rules to be used and, thereby, Fl(vision) as well. Within SIT, such a regularity criterion has been formalized by means of the so-called holographic approach. The holographic approach has been developed for regularity in onedimensional symbol series, but its features can be generalized straightforwardly to regularity in two-dimensional patterns. For the formal details, I refer the reader to van der Helm and Leeuwenberg ( , 1996 . Here, I give an informal overview of what the holographic approach entails.
To some extent, the holographic approach can be seen as a reaction to, and a refinement of, the only other existing formalization of regularity, namely, the traditional transformational approach. The latter was developed originally to classify threedimensional crystal regularities, but its features can also be applied to regularity in two-dimensional patterns (see, e.g., ShubrLikov & Koptsik, 1974; Weyl, 1952) . In perception, it has been advocated most prominently by Garner (1974) and Palmer (1983) . The most striking difference between the holographic approach and the transformational approach concerns not so much the regularities resulting from each approach but rather the fact that the holographic approach provides for a much better understanding of the goodness (i.e., visual detectability) of single, perturbed, and com- 
bined instances of these regularities in two-dimensional patterns (see van der Helm & Leeuwenberg, 1996 . The holographic approach started from a mathematical formalization of all imaginable kinds of regularity in symbol series and resulted in two subcriteria that are proposed to specify together the regularities that are accessible by perception. The first subcriterion applies to single regularities and states that a regularity should be holographic. That is, the structure of the regularity should be such that all its substructures reflect the same kind of regularity, or, stated differently, the regularity should be invariant under growth (as opposed to the transformational approach, which, generally, focuses on invariance under motion). For instance, the holographic character of the repetition in the symbol series aaaaaaa is reflected by the fact that this series can be expanded with additional symbols a, preserving its repetition structure. Similarly, the mirror symmetry in natural forms, such as animals and flowers, has a holographic character: These forms preserve their symmetric structure when growing.
The second subcriterion applies to combinations of regularities and states that such a combination should be transparent. That is, each of the combined regularities should also be accessible separately. This is no problem for nonoverlapping regularities, but it restricts hierarchical combinations of overlapping regularities. This is illustrated best by an example of nontransparency, as follows. The symbol series axbyazbxaybz could be described as a threefold repetition of ab intertwined with a twofold repetition of xyz. However, the symbol series itself does not contain any repetition (i.e., adjacent identical subsequences)--therefore, this description is not transparent.
Hence, the subcriteria of holography and transparency in fact specify two basic notions in descriptive coding languages, namely, regularity and hierarchy (cf. Simon, 1972 ; see also The Simplicity and Likelihood Principles in Perception, above). The subcriteria may seem rather trivial, but their implications are far from trivial. Among the infinite number of imaginable kinds of regularity, there are only 20 kinds of holographic regularity, and only 3 of these 20 regularities allow for hierarchically transparent descriptions. These 3 regularities are repetition, bilateral symmetry, and socalled alternation. The latter regularity is exhibited by, for example, the randomly positioned but uniformly oriented dipoles in Glass patterns. The coding rules, used nowadays in SIT, describe precisely these 3 regularities (see Table 7 ). In other words, SIT allows only object descriptions squeezing out these 3 regularities. Thus, preceding considerations about probabilities or complexities, SIT assumes that the perceptually accessible part ~(vision) of O(AIT) is specified by the concepts of holography and transparency. This also affects the computability problem, as I discuss next.
The perceptual computability problem comprises, for a given proximal stimulus, the generation of candidate distal stimuli that each are to be judged to select the best one. I first address the generation problem. As discussed above, present-day likelihood approaches focus on heuristics that fit in the simplicity paradigm as well. These heuristics can be very useful in obtaining a restricted set of perceptually plausible candidate distal stimuli for a given proximal stimulus. Within the likelihood paradigm, it is unclear which concrete heuristics are implied by the real-world probabilities, whereas, within SIT, the concepts of holography and transparency now enable a more concrete specification. These concepts imply, for instance, heuristics that, given the visible stimulus, extrapolate only transparent holographic regularities to nonvisible parts--a generalized form of good continuation (cf. van Lier et al., 1995) .
The next problem is to judge each candidate distal stimulus and to select the best one. This problem can hardly be solved by proposing a precedence order for the heuristics above because simultaneously applicable heuristics may have different effects in different patterns (analogous to the classical Gestalt problem of competing Gestalt laws). Within the likelihood paradigm, this problem therefore seems to imply that the real-world probability of each candidate distal stimulus is to be assessed, but, so far, it is unclear how this might be done. Within SIT, the complexity of each candidate distal stimulus is to be computed, which is dealt with in the following two steps.
First, a candidate distal stimulus is represented symbolically by a primitive code, that is, a symbol series that describes the distal stimulus more or less analogous to a pixel-wise specification of an image. This can be done in many ways, and, for this subproblem, SIT does not yet have a generally applicable solution (for related work on this issue, see, e.g., Dastani, 1998; Feldman, 1997) . In practice, SIT's primitive codes are chosen such that they account for the perceptual variation in the empirical stimulus set at hand.
The second step is the encoding of such a primitive code into a shortest possible code by maximally squeezing out transparent holographic regularity (the computational aspect of this subproblem is independent of the employed complexity measure). The number of possible shorter codes is combinatoriaUy explosive, and naively generating them kll would be neither computationally acceptable nor psychologically realistic (Collard & Buffart, 1983; Hatfield & Epstein, 1985) . This problem, however, has been solved by means of graph-theoretical methods implemented in the encoding algorithm PISA (van der Helm, 1988; van der Helm & Leeuwenberg, 1986 . PISA computes a guaranteed simplest code by nipping the combinatorial explosion in the bud: All possible codes are taken into account but without considering each and every code separately. The following may give a gist of the effect of PISA's methods.
For a primitive code of N elements, one strong explosion comprises an exponential 0(2 N) search that, in PISA, has been reduced to a polynomial O(N 2) search, by applying Dijkstra's (1959) socalled shortest path method. Another strong explosion comprises O(N) exponential 0(2 ~v) searches that, in PISA, have been reduced to a constant O(1) search each--this major reduction turns out to be feasible by explicitly using the transparent holographic character of the regularities. What remains is a logarithmic O(2 l°g N) explosion that, as such, is already computationally acceptable. Current research suggests that this weak explosion, too, might be eliminated-then, PISA's total search would require a polynomial O(N 4) computing time.
The foregoing shows that a realistic computation depends not only on the extent to which constraints restrict the search space but also on the intrinsic nature of the constraints. The question now is: How does SIT's constrained search relate to AIT's unconstrained search? That is, SIT's constraints imply that SIT and AIT may result in quite different simplest descriptions of an object. This means that an AIT-SIT interaction is hardly possible if it were to concern the categorizations induced by these codes. However, the foregoing implies that the currently intended AIT-SIT interaction is still possible because it concerns just the complexities of these codes. Indeed, a descriptive code does not consist of a list of (all) regularities in an object, but, by definition, it can capture only a (maximal) subset of combinable regularities. This suggests that little is gained by including more kinds of regularity than SIT allows: It results almost certainly in a major increase of the computability problem and probably (if at all) in only a minor decrease of the complexity of simplest descriptions. As indicated, the possibility of an AIT-SIT interaction codepends on how SIT actually measures complexity--this issue is discussed next.
Structural Complexities
As discussed earlier, AIT measures the complexity of a code by its syntactic length, which agrees with the classical informationtheoretic ideas about a practical information measurement for messages to be transmitted. Soon after Shannon's (1948) work became known in psychology, however, MacKay (1950) realized that psychology needed something else, and he made the influential decomposition of the classical concept of information into two psychological concepts of information: the logon (a term from Gabor, 1946 ) and the metron. MacKay used these terms in a probabilistic sense. The logon refers to the logical structure of a psychological experiment and concerns, for instance, the set of observations in the experiment. The metron refers to the precision of the numerical measurements in the experiment. Next, I sketch how MacKay's idea, by way of Garner's (1962 Garner's ( , 1970 Garner's ( , 1974 work, led to SIT's proposal of a perceptually sound measurement of complexity. Garner (1962) pointed out that MacKay's distinction is meaningful because humans do not seem to use the two types of information with equal effectiveness. Garner also mentioned that the logon is closely related to the concept of degrees of freedom, which he presented in a classical information-theoretic, and therefore probabilistic, context--but with a crucial difference. That is, Garner argued that the goodness of an individual pattern is related to the size of the subset of those patterns that can be said to be alternatives (i.e., degrees of freedom) for the individual pattern. 6 In the classical context, the subset would be a predefined set of alternatives that need not have any intrinsic relation (see Figure 6) . Garner, however, proposed that perception infers the subset from intrinsic properties of an individual pattern. One implementation of this idea could be that the inferred subset comprises all patterns that can be formed from the same set of primitives (Garner, t970) .
Another implementation is given by Garner's famous R & R subsets, in which case the alternatives are supposed to be inferred by means of a restricted set of rotations and reflections of an individual pattern (Garner & Clement, 1963) . For instance, a 90 ° rotation turns a twofold mirror symmetry into another pattern (i.e., yields an alternative), but it leaves a fourfold mirror symmetry invariant (i.e., does not yield an alternative). Strengthened by empirical data, Garner then concluded that "good patterns have few alternatives" (Garner, 1970) . This conclusion expresses Garner's view that, perceptually, the degrees of freedom of a pattern are often more important than its exact numerical properties. Now, as I discuss next, SIT's complexity measurement is based on a descriptive implementation of the foregoing ideas.
In SIT, MacKay's logon-metron distinction reappears as the distinction between structural and metrical information in a code.
This distinction may be illustrated by the following three situations. First, let an arbitrary quadrangle be described by a code that specifies the size of each angle and edge separately. Such a code contains only metrical information: It represents, within a certain resolution, only the exact sizes of the pattern elements. It does not contain structural information, that is, it does not indicate that the pattern is anything more specific than just a quadrangle. Second, let some quadrangle be described by a code specifying effectively that, among other things, all four angles are identical (i.e., four angles of 90°). If this code also specifies that all four edges are identical, then it actually classifies the quadrangle as square. If, instead, it specifies merely that each edge is identical to its opposite edge, then it actually classifies the quadrangle as rectangle. In these two cases, the same concrete quadrangle is described, butit is classified differently. That is, the two cases involve the same metrical information but different structural information. Third, a square and a rectangle necessarily have to be described by metrically different codes, but these codes may yet classify them both as, for example, rectangle--in that case, the codes contain different metrical information but the same structural information. The just-mentioned classification actually reflects a descriptive implementation of Garner's idea of inferred subsets. That is, this classification implies that all metrical variations of a specific structure are taken to constitute one perceptual category. The structural information in a code of a specific object can thus be said to induce a structural class, that is, the set of all metrical variants of the structure described by the code. In other words, inside a structural class, there is metrical freedom. For instance, within the set of quadrangles, the square structure has one degree of metrical freedom, namely, the length of the four identical edges. Now, suppose that, because of restricted (sensory) resolution, only a finite number--say, )t--of metrical variations can be distinguished for each degree of metrical freedom in a structure. Then, the square structure constitutes a class of A different squares.
6 In the 1950s and 1960s, the intuitive Gestalt notion of goodness was generally operationalized empirically in terms of, for example, matching, remembering, and learning paradigms, and it was considered to be closely related to the notion of simplicity (see also Hochberg & McAlister, 1953) . Later operationalizations focused more and more on the detectability of visual regularities (see, e.g., Wagemans, 1995) , in which case goodness and simplicity seem to be still related but also quite distinguishable (see van der Helm & Leeuwenberg, 1996 .
Similarly, the rectangle structure has two degrees of metrical freedom, namely, the lengths of the pairwise identical edges, so that this structure constitutes a class of ~t 2 different rectangles. As a final example, the parallelogram structure has one additional degree of metrical freedom, concerning the size of the angles, so that this structure constitutes a class of )t 3 different parallelograms (see Figure 9) .
In view of the foregoing and in line with Garner's motto Good patterns have few alternatives, Collard and Buffart (1983) argued that a perceptually sound measurement of code complexity is to be stated in terms of the structural information in a code. That is, they proposed to define the complexity of a code by the number of degrees of metrical freedom in the induced structural class. This implies, for instance, that a square code is simpler than a rectangle code, which, in turn, is simpler than a parallelogram code (see Figure 9 ). Collard and Buffart's proposal means that code complexity is not measured syntactically but semantically, that is, it derives from a perceptually meaningful classification of patterns. This proposal has been elaborated further by van der Helm and , resulting in a concrete complexity measure for SIT codes, which, conceptually, is also closely related to the concept of transparent code hierarchy discussed in the previous section. Empirically, this new complexity measure performs significantly better than various imaginable and previously proposed complexity measures (see van der Helm, 1994; van der Helm et al., 1992) , and it is nowadays the standard within SIT.
The new complexity measure generalizes Collard and Buffart's (1983) ideas by including the degrees of freedom at higher hierarchical levels in a code, that is, not just the degrees of metrical freedom that are present at only the lowest hierarchical level in a code. For instance, for the symbol series abababababab, the SIT code 2 * (3 * (ab)) has three hierarchical levels: The highest level is 2 * (X) where X reflects a degree of freedom, the second level Figure 9 . Venn diagram with some structural classes of quadrangles. If, due to restricted (sensory) resolution, only )t line lengths and )t angles are distinguished, then there are A squares, A 2 rectangles, )~2 diamonds, A 3 parallelograms, )t 3 trapezoids, and )t s quadrangles. The squares form the intersection of the rectangles and the diamonds. The diamonds form a subset of the parallelograms. The rectangles form the intersection of the parallelograms and the trapezoids.
is 3 * (Y) where Y reflects a degree of freedom, and the third level is ab where a and b each reflect a degree of (metrical) freedom--hence, four degrees of freedom in total. By the same token, the code 6 * (ab) has only three degrees of freedom and is therefore measured as being simpler than the code 2 * (3 * (ab)). In Collard and Buffart's proposal, these two codes would have the same complexity, as both codes exhibit two degrees of metrical freedom.
T o express the generalization aspect of the new complexity measure, I propose the sip (structural information parameter) as unit of measurement for the structural information in a code. One sip corresponds to one structural degree of freedom, that is, to one degree of freedom at no matter which hierarchical level in a code. Furthermore, in analogy to AIT' s notion of Kolmogorov complexity K(x), the complexity (in sips) of the simplest SIT code for a given object x is called the Leeuwenberg complexity L(x) of the object x. Now, in the previous section, I concluded that SIT's description constraints hardly (if at all) hinder an AIT-SIT interaction concerning object complexities, but I also indicated that such an interaction codepends on how complexities are actually measured in AIT and SIT, respectively. Hence, the question now is: How does SIT's semantic complexity L(x), which measures structural information in sips, relate to AIT's syntactic complexity
K(x), which measures algorithmic information in bits?
Relevant to this question is that, although SIT measures code complexity in terms of structural information only, the metrical information in a code is not supposed to be discarded. It is merely supposed to be ignored in, for instance, perceptual classification tasks but may well be important in other tasks (see, e.g., Hanssen, Leeuwenberg, & van der Helm, 1993) . Hence, perception is supposed to work with one multiple-purpose code, various aspects of which can be attended to selectively, depending on the task at hand (cf. Garner, 1966; Leeuwenberg & van der Helm, 2000) . This view and SIT's view that a code remains a reconstruction recipe for a specific object are shared by, for example, spatial frequency thetry, which considers a reconstructivist Fourier decomposition, various components of which can be attended to selectively (for an overview, see, e.g., Palmer, 1999 , who also discusses physiological evidence supporting these views).
The foregoing implies that a rough indication of the syntactic complexity of a SIT code can be given as follows. For each degree of metrical freedom (i.e., at the lowest hierarchical level in a code), the assumed resolution implies that ,~ metrical variations are to be distinguished. If these metrical variations can be specified by the decimal numerals 1, 2, 3 . . . . . )t, then the binary specification'of one of these metrical variations requires log2(20 bits. This implies that sips at the lowest hierarchical level in a code can be converted into bits by means of the equation
The constant ,k can, more generally, be seen as a system constant, the value of which depends on how complete descriptions are syntactically (i.e., physically) represented at the neural level. Then, the conversion rule in Equation 6 seems appropriate for sips at higher hierarchical levels in a code as well. For instance, the earlier discussed SIT codes 2 * (3 * (ab)) and 6 * (ab) have semantic complexities of 4 sips and 3 sips, respectively, and it seems that, for some value of )t, conversion into 4 × log2(,k) and 3 × log2()~) gives a fair indication of the syntactic complexities (in bits) of these two codes. This has the following two implications.
First, SIT's present-day semantic complexity measure was developed to obtain a perceptually more sound alternative to the syntactic complexity measures that were used by SIT and other perceptual coding approaches. The foregoing implies, however, that a code that is semantically shorter (i.e., fewer sips) is also syntactically shorter (i.e., fewer bits). Hence, the foregoing also implies preservation of the validity of the earlier given psychological rationale (in terms of memory efficiency) for aiming at syntactically short codes--even though, conceptually, syntactic brevity is now a by-product.
Second, if some object x has a Leeuwenberg complexity of L(x) sips, then, by Equation 6, its shortest SIT code has a syntactic complexity of about C(x) = L(x) × logz()t) bits. This syntactic complexity C(x) is not to be confused with the Kolmogorov complexity K(x). After all, K(x) results from minimizing the total information, that is, a possible reduction of structural information might be ignored in order to allow a larger reduction of metrical information. Such a trade-off, however, does not seem to play a role in visual stimuli. For instance, if a square is selected as stimulus, then the exact (distal or proximal) size of its edges is generally chosen fairly arbitrarily, that is, it is not chosen to allow a very compact binary specification of this size. Hence, for visual stimuli, C(x) = L(x) × log2()t) seems a fair approximation of K(x). In other words, K(x) and L(x) seem to be highly correlated (see also Figure 10A ). This is my starting point in the next section, in which I discuss how AIT and SIT reached, by different lines of reasoning, a similar precisal concept.
Algorithmic and Structural Precisals
In The Age of Information, above, I discussed how the surprisal concept resulted, by generalization, from considering a simple activity like tossing coins. AIT's precisal concept can be introduced in a similar way, by means of a generalization based on two simple observations. The first observation is that, by definition, all objects with fixed Kolmogorov complexity K can each be described by a binary sequence of length K. There are B = 2 x different binary sequences of length K, so there are maximally B objects of Kolmogorov complexity K (not every binary sequence of length K describes an object of Kolmogorov complexity K). The second observation is that, if one randomly generates binary sequences of fixed length K, then the individual sequences have a uniform probability p = 2 -x of being generated. 7 The generalization step then is to combine the two foregoing observations into the assumption that equally complex objects x have a uniform probability (of resulting from a random generation process) and that this probability is equal to the so-called algorithmic precisal
Hence, this precisal formula postulates a concrete probability for an individual object, starting from the algorithmically shortest descriptive code of the object. In other words, the precisal reflects a set-based property (i.e., a probability) of an object, defmed in terms of an object-based property (i.e., a complexity) of the object. This contrasts with the surprisal, which, inversely, reflects ah object-based property defined in terms of a set-based property. Yet it seems expedient to also recognize the following analogical link between the two concepts.
..... surprllml -log P(x) ~ ...... probability P(x) ' ",',, ..
objects x objects x
A B Figure 10 . Qualitative impression of how the margin between simplicity and likelihood might look in information terms (A) and in certainty terms (B). In both cases, the horizontal axis represents all possible objects x ordered by increasing complexity C(x) as obtained by means of some concrete descriptive coding language. The relative heights of the three curves in A (and analogously in B) are perhaps depicted somewhat suggestively but do satisfy at the least the following constraints. First, the difference between the universal Kolmogorov complexiw K(x) and C(x) , that is, K(x) -C(x), is smaller than or equal to a positive constant that depends on only the concrete coding language (see section entitled Structural Versus Algorithmic Information Theory in text). Second, for some concrete enumerable probability distribution P(x), the surprisal -log P(x) is always smaller than or equal to K(x), the difference being maximally equal to the Kolmogorov complexity K(P) of P(x) (see section entitled The Relation Between Simplicity and Likelihood in text).
AIT measures information I in terms of the Kolmogorov complexity K, while there are maximally B = 2 K objects with this complexity K. This implies that
This equation is similar to the fundamental Equation 3, above, that is, I = U = log2(Z), in which information I and uncertainty U were logarithmically related to the number Z of possible outcomes of an activity. The analogy is that, this time, the activity is the random generation of objects, with (maximally) B possible outcomes (see Table 4 ). Thus, in classical information-theoretic terms, K can be said to quantify the uncertainty (in bits) that is removed by a specific outcome of this random generation process. In the present context, K can alternatively be said to reflect the number of algorithmic degrees of freedom to be removed (by choosing bits to be 0 or 1) to describe a specific outcome. This may also clarify the term precisal: A smaller K implies a more precise object specification, that is, a specification that classifies an object as belonging to a smaller subset of all possible objects. SIT's precisal concept is based on a rather different fine of reasoning, as follows. As discussed in the previous section, SIT measures information I in terms of the Leeuwenberg complexity L of an object, which is given by a code with L structural degrees of freedom. These are not all degrees of metrical freedom as in Collard and Buffart's (1983) proposal, but, by way of generaliza-7 For the sake of the argument, I sidestep technical questions like: Are all these binary sequences suited to be computer codes, and do they all produce different objects? I also sidestep the question of what, in the third and fourth parts, the normalization factor should be to comply with the laws of statistics. These questions are currently less relevant and have been treated sufficiently satisfactorily in AIT (see Li & Vit~inyi, 1997) . tion, the code can be assumed to induce a structural class comprising S = )t L variants, where )t is some system-dependent constant (see also Figure 9 ). This implies, now, the logarithmic relation I = L = logx(S).
The analogy with the fundamental Equation 3, above, that is, I = U = log2(Z), now differs from the analogy for Equation 8. This time, the activity is the instantiation of a specific structure, with S variants as possible outcomes (see Table 4 ). Hence, both here and in the case of Equation 8, the outcomes are specific objects, but the subsets from which they are drawn differ. In the case of Equation 8, a subset consists of all objects of equal complexity K, disregarding structural differences. Here, a subset does not consist of all objects of equal complexity L, but only of those having the same structure. Furthermore, in the case of Equation 8, the various subsets are not overlapping, whereas, here, the various subsets are overlapping (and often even nested, as in Figure 9 )--the latter situation seems to comply best with how perceptual categories are related (Garner, 1966) . These differences imply that, this time, a perceptually more plausible precisal concept can be formulated as follows.
As discussed in the previous section, SIT assumes that, to classify an object, perception ignores everything except the structural information in the shortest code of the object. This descriptive assumption corresponds to the probabilistic assumption that all variants of a given structure have a uniform probability (of resulting from instantiating this structure). That is, for an object x, a code that describes a structure with L(x) degrees of freedom induces a structural class of A L~x) variants (among which object x), so that the probability of object x can be assumed to be equal to the so-called structural precisal
Hence, analogous to the algorithmic precisal Palg(X), the structural precisal Pst~(x) postulates a concrete probability for an individual object, starting from the structurally shortest code of the object. Of course, the structural precisal Pstr(X) is not just the same for all objects with the same structure but in fact for all objects having the same complexity L(x)--again analogous to the algorithmic precisal Palg(X). Furthermore, by Equation 6, the structural precisal psi(x) = )t -L~x) can also be written as pst~(x) = 2 -c~x), with C(x) = L(x) × log:(A) bits. Now, in the previous section, I concluded that K(x) and L(x) are highly correlated and that C(x) = L(x) × log:()t) is a fair approximation of K(x). In other words, for individual objects, it does not seem to matter much whether their probabilities are quantified by the algorithmic precisal or by the structural precisal (see also Figure 10B ).
Discussion
This part shows that, in hindsight, SIT can indeed be seen as a perception-tailored version of the domain-independent AIT approach. SIT comprises a coherent conglomerate of' perceptually sound ideas about the set of accessible object descriptions, about the way in which complexities are to be measured, and about how precisals might be derived from complexities. Although these ideas were developed independently of AIT, the perceptual implementation of these ideas is such that it still enables the currently intended AIT-SIT interaction concerning the complexities and related precisals of simplest object descriptions. Before this AIT-SIT interaction takes place (in the next part), I first put SIT's precisal concept in a somewhat broader perspective as follows.
The precisal formula in Equation 10 reflects the proposal, by Leeuwenberg and Boselie (1988) , to redefine the likelihood principle such that it uses structural precisals as probabilities. As such, this proposal is as (im)plausible as Pomerantz and Kubovy's (1986) inverse proposal to redefine the simplicity principle such that it yields surprisals as code lengths (see The Age of Information, above). There is, however, also a major difference. Pomerantz and Kubovy's proposal does not comprise a quantitative answer to the threefold question of which codes are to be related to which probabilities of which categories. Leeuwenberg and Boselie's proposal, however, does comprise an answer: The probabilities are the structural precisals for the categories induced by descriptive codes. It remains to be seen whether this answer is appropriate for prior probabilities, but it does seem appropriate for conditional probabilities, as I illustrate next.
For patterns like those in Figures 2 and 4 , it is easy to assess intuitively that the pairs of shapes have different conditional probabilities, which, however, presupposes that each pair of shapes falls in another category of relative positions. Now, van Lier et al.'s (1994) conditional complexity Iext~r~a indicates that each pair of shapes indeed induces its own category of relative positions. For instance, in Figure 4A , the position of the short stick, relative to the long stick, has full freedom in the sense that the short stick can be rotated and translated freely (in the picture plane) without leaving its category, that is, without requiring another code to describe the pattern. In Figure 4B , the short stick can still be rotated freely, but it can only be translated along the long stick--it has lost one degree of freedom. In Figure 4C , the short stick has lost a second degree of freedom, because it can still be rotated freely, but it can no more be translated. In Figure 4C , the short stick has lost a third degree of freedom. The number of the lost degrees of freedom corresponds to lextem~a, and Equation 10, with L --lext~m~a, now yields precisals that seem to quantify accurately what one would assess intuitively to be the conditional probabilities.
Furthermore, the concept of degrees of freedom also resolves a paradox in van Lier et al.'s (1994) integrative approach, that is, (form) regularity within shapes yields a lower (prior) complexity, whereas (positional) regularity between shapes yields a higher (conditional) complexity. As discussed in the first part, argued that these opposed effects of regularity occur because regularity is a sort of perceptual glue. Now, formulated in terms of degrees of freedom, the paradox disappears entirely. That is, the prior complexity of an interpretation corresponds to the number of degrees of freedom to be removed to specify the form of the hypothesized distal shapes. Subsequently, the conditional complexity corresponds to the number of degrees of freedom to be removed to specify the proximal positions of these shapes. This formulation agrees with the Occamian reasoning in the first part and indicates again that a simple summation is indeed the proper way to integrate prior and conditional complexities.
The foregoing shows that the precisal concept is, at the least, a nice theoretical concept--just as the surprisal concept was before Shannon's (1948) breakthrough. This, however, immediately evokes two questions. First, through Shannon's work, the surprisal concept turned out to make sense indeed, in that it enabled optimal encoding (as discussed above in The Age of Information). The first question therefore is whether something similar applies also to the precisal concept. Furthermore, the current part illustrates that, in certainty terms, the simplicity-likelihood controversy boils down to the discrepancy between descriptive and probabilistic certainty, that is, between precisals and real-world probabilities based, for example, on frequencies of occurrence (see Table 3 ). The second question therefore is whether this controversy can be understood better through these certainty terms than through the information terms surprisal and complexity (see discussion above in The Age of Information). These two questions are the central issues addressed in the following part.
The Relation Between Simplicity and Likelihood
Basically, this part sketches the story of AIT's quest, initiated by Solomonoff (1964a Solomonoff ( , 1964b , to design universal probabilities, that is, probabilities that can be used to make predictions in no matter what situation. Such probabilities would be useful particularly in situations in which there is no direct access to the real probabilities. Visual perception research is such a situation, and visual perception itself might in fact be such a Situation (i.e., it is perhaps plausible but not obvious that perception does have access to the real-world probabilities). It is therefore intriguing to learn that AIT research has provided mathematical proof that the algorithmic precisals Palg = 2-r are probabilities that can be used fairly universally (i.e., in many situations).
From the previous part, it follows that this mathematical proof can be taken as evidence (i.e., not as proof) that the structural precisals Pst~ = )~-L enable veridical perception in many possible words (a comforting thought regarding future explorations into deep space). That is, structural precisals seem to enable reliable predictions about the real distal stimuli that caused given proximal stimuli. This agrees with Perkins's (1976) empirical data which suggest that interpretations based on simplicity run little risk of misinterpreting stimuli. Veridical perception is a crucial evolutionary condition for survival, and the foregoing would suggest that, within the simplicity paradigm, veridicaiity (in many worlds) constitutes an emergent feature of simplest descriptions--as opposed to the likelihood paradigm, in which veridicality (in only this world) constitutes the starting point for the choice of the probabilities. Be that as it may, the most important property universal probabilities should have is to be close to (almost) any imaginable set of real probabilities. Next, I begin by sketching Solomonoff's (1964a Solomonoff's ( , 1964b ideas about how this condition might be satisfied. Solomonoff' s (1964a Solomonoff' s ( , 1964b Universal Probabilities Solomonoff's (1964a Solomonoff's ( , 1964b intention was to develop a theory of inductive inference. Inductive inference, using Bayes's rule, suffers from the problem that, often, the real probabilities are unknown. To circumvent this problem, Solomonoff proposed to use descriptive codes to design probabilities that, he hoped, would be universal in the sense I indicated above. Solomonoff felt that an object should be given a high probability "if it has short descriptions and/or many different descriptions" (Solomonoff, 1964a, p. 7) . That is, he felt that all descriptions of an object should be taken into account rather than just its shortest description as in the algorithmic precisal. His rationale can be explicated as follows.
Suppose one generates randomly binary codes of arbitrary lengths, after which a computer constructs the objects described by these codes. For instance, one might flip a fair coin an arbitrary number of times and translate the resulting sequence of heads and tails into a sequence of ones and zeros. Then, the probability that a specific binary code of length k results is 2 -k. Thus, a simple object (short code) seems more likely to be produced than a complex object (long code). However, an object seems also more likely to be produced if there are more ways to produce the object, that is, if there are more codes that describe the object. The latter aspect seems to differentiate between the simplicity of, for instance, the binary sequences 10 and 11111111111. The sequence 10,is simple because of its intrinsic brevity of two bits (and it has no alternative descriptions), whereas the sequence 11111111111 is simple because its regularity allows for a short description (and it has many alternative descriptions). In perceptual terms, a straight line is simple because it is just a line, whereas a square is simple because its regularity allows not only for a short square description but also, for example, for a rectangle or trapezoid description.
The foregoing may illustrate Solomonoff's idea that, to design a universal probability for an object, one should include the probabilities (of being generated at random) of all descriptions of the object. Solomonoff's original proposal has been adjusted slightly in AIT, and, nowadays, his universal probability Q(x) of object x is defined by (somewhat simplified)
Q(x) = ~ 2 -r(a) (11) d (x) in which the codes d(x) are all descriptive codes of object x, with lengths l(d). Now, Solomonoff may have proposed these Q(x) as universal probabilities, but actually how universal are these probabilities? Can these Q(x) indeed be said to be more universal than the algorithmic precisals Palg ----2-r which include only shortest descriptions? These questions became answerable by the so-called Coding Theorem (Chaitin, 1975; Levin, 1974) . Next, I discuss merely what this theorem states, without giving its proof (for more details, see, e.g., Li & Vit~nyi, 1997, chapter 4) .
The Coding Theorem
The Coding Theorem can be sketched conveniently in two steps. First, it states that the algorithmic precisal Palg(X) and Solomonoff's probability Q(x)are equivalent, that is, equal up to a multiplicative constant. Since Q(x) is based on all descriptions of x and Palg(X) on only its shortest description, this equivalence means that the seemingly more plausible probability Q(x) is nonetheless, just like Palg(X), dominated by the shortest description of x.
Second, the Coding Theorem states that Palg(X) and Q(x) are not only equivalent to each other but also equivalent to the so-called universal distribution re(x), which is defined by re(x) = ~ 2 -r~n~ × P,(x).
(12) n_>l For the present study, it is not really necessary to fully understand this intricate formula. However, to give more insight into its far-reaching implications (which are discussed in the next sections), it seems expedient to explicate a few aspects of this important formula.
First, in re(x), as well as in Palg(X) and Q(x), the variable x is in fact the binary representation of a positive integer number. Perceptually, this may seem awkward, but x stands for an object in the sense that its binary representation, taken as a computer program, gives a, say, "pixel-wise" description of an object. Second, the Pn(x) (n = 1, 2, 3 .... ) are all so-called enumerable probability distributions over the objects x. An enumerable distribution is (or can be approximated, with arbitrary precision, by) a rationalvalued function of two nonnegative integer arguments. Examples of such distributions are the uniform distribution, the normal distribution, and the Poisson distribution. Third, K(n) is the Kolmogorov complexity of the running index n. Again, this may seem awkward but perhaps slightly less so in view of the fact that the running index n is an integer just like the objects x. Be that as it may, the following indicates that this factor K(n) is yet rather crucial.
The universal character of m(x) follows from the fact that it dominates each of the enumerable distributions P,(x). That is, Equation 12 implies, for each n, that re(x) --> 2 -x~") × P,(x).
In simple words, this domination relation, means that if some enumerable distribution P,(x) assigns a high probability to object x, then re(x) also assigns a relatively high probability to x. This means that re(x) can be said to be fairly close to any (enumerable) probability distribution one might want to consider within the likelihood paradigm. It also contains, however, the factor 2 -x¢"~ stemming from the simplicity paradigm. To get a universal distribution, this factor can also be chosen to be, for example, 2 -n, but the fact that it can be chosen to be 2 -K~"~ may already give a hint that a link between the two paradigms can be established (see next sections).
The foregoing probably does not remove the feeling that re(x) is a rather weird theoretical construct. It is defined in terms of an infinite number of probability distributions Pn(x) that each get a weight factor 2 -ten) in which K(n) is the complexity not of the object x but of the index n the distribution happens to have. This contrasts with p~ag(X) and Q(x), which are rather straightforwardly defined in terms of the complexity of descriptions of the object x. It is therefore quite remarkable that, as stated by the Coding Theorem, the equality
holds up to a multiplicative constant. This implies not only that Solomonoff could have used p~g(x) instead of Q(x) but also that, because P~lg(X) = 2 -x¢~, the equality
holds for some constant C. The universal character of re(x) implies that -!ogzm(x ) can be said to be fairly close to any concrete surprisal -log2P,(x), so that the latter equation implies that simplicity and likelihood might indeed be close. How close they are, is explored further in the next sections. I first show how the Coding Theorem has led to a perceptually relevant generalization of Shannon's (1948) Noiseless Coding Theorem, and then I sketch how the Coding Theorem has led to a deep insight into the margin between simplicity and likelihood.
Optimal Encoding and the Short-Term Memory
In the Discussion section of the Age of Information, above, I mentioned that the paradigm shift from probabilistic to descriptive accounts seems to have been triggered by the desire to repeat Shannon's (1948) work but without having to know the probability distribution. In Shannon's approach, an optimal encoding of messages was obtained by using surprisal codes, that is, label codes with lengths equal to the negative logarithm of the known probabilities of occurrence of the messages. Hence, now, the question is whether optimal encoding is also achieved by using simplest descriptive codes which, after all, have lengths that do not depend on probabilities of occurrence. An affirmative answer is implied by the Coding Theorem, as I show next by means of a typical AIT proof (taken from Li & Vit~rtyi, 1997, pp. 522-524) . This proof requires only that the probability distribution be (approximately) enumerable---for the rest, it may be arbilraty.
Suppose objects x from a set X occur as frequently as given by the enumerable distribution Pn(x), where n is its index in the definition of the universal distribution re(x). Furthermore, suppose that each object x is represented by its shortest descriptive code, which, in AIT, has length K(x). Then, the long-term average code length, say, A(X), is obtained by weighting these code lengths by the probabilities of occurrence of the objects:
x As discussed in the second part, Shannon's Noiseless Coding Theorem showed that the entropy I(X) is the theoretical lower bound for the long-term average code length no matter what kinds of codes are ttsed---hence, also in case descriptive codes are used, so that, on the one hand,
x On the other hand, combining Equation 15 with the domination relation in Equation 13 yields
If one substitutes this in Equation 16, then one finds
where C(n) = K(n) + C. Since Pn is a probability distribution, the second sum equals 1. The first sum turns out to be I(X), so that the combination of Equations 17 and 19 yields
I(X) <-A(X) <--I(X) + C(n).
This means that the actual long-term average code length A(X) is equal to the optimum I(X), within an additive constant C(n). In other words, simplest descriptive codes yield near optimal encoding. In AIT, the constant C(n) is seen as a machine-dependent factor that, often, is so small that one can even speak of fully optimal encoding--just as yielded by surprisal codes. To give a suggestion that this holds for any descriptive coding language, the next example illustrates that different descriptive coding languages have about the same average code length. That is, a bookshelf for, say, 100 French books needs to have about the same length as the bookshelf for the English translations of these French books--the constant C(n) can then be seen as depending on whether the books are, for example, paperbacks or hardcovers. Perceptually, the foregoing AIT proof of (near) optimal encoding seems relevant with respect to the visual short-term memory (STM). The STM can be seen as a sort of transmission channel through which a specific interpretation is transmitted at a rate that depends on the frequency of occurrence of stimuli thus interpreted. If these interpretation frequencies correspond to an enumerable probability distribution and if the visual system uses (a neural equivalent of) simplest descriptive codes, then the foregoing AIT proof implies that the long-term average burden on the STM is minimal. Such a minimal STM burden seems evolutionary relevant because it enables an efficient usage of brain capacity and because it is fairly independent of the ever-changing real-world probability distribution (as opposed to Shannon's approach, in which the current probability distribution is all decisive). This does, of course, not yet mean that the interpretations are veridical--this evolutionary even more important issue is addressed in the next section.
The Margin Between Simplicity and Likelihood
Because veridicality is the starting point within the likelihood paradigm, the likelihood principle yields, by definition, reliable predictions. The evolutionary survival value of a visual system using (a neural equivalent of) the likelihood principle seems therefore higher than the evolutionary survival value of a visual system using (a neural equivalent of) the simplicity principle, which, after all, is basically an efficiency principle. However, the one-liner "survival of the fittest" is somewhat misleading because evolutionary selection actually implies "death for the unfit." That is, evolution does not necessarily result in the best solutions but in solutions that are, apparently, sufficiently good. In other words, even though the simplicity principle does not start from veridicality, it may still provide sufficient survival value. It seems to provide a sufficiently good solution for the visual STM (see previous section), but does it yield a sufficient degree of veridicality? Here, AIT insights are again helpful, as I sketch next.
The simplicity principle could be said to be fully veridical if the structural precisals are probabilities that correspond exactly to the real-world probabilities. Whether or not this is true, however, seems unprovable--at least, as long as an actual quantification of the real-world probabilities is lacking. However, the simplicity principle might yield an evolutionary sufficient degree of veridicality if the structural precisals are sufficiently universal, that is, sufficiently close to (almost) any imaginable set of probabilities. As discussed earlier, AIT's Coding Theorem already implies that the algorithmic precisals might indeed be quite universal, that is, they might be fairly close to any enumerable distribution Pn(x), where n is again its index in the definition of the universal distribution re(x). Now, AIT also.provides a proof that establishes a more precise specification of the margin between the algorithmic precisals and Pn(x). For the details of this proof, I refer the reader to Li and Vit~inyi (1997, pp. 356-359) . Here, I show only its result in information terms, which is the so-called Fundamental Inequality (see also Figure 10 and Footnote 8):
Hence, over all objects x, the maximal difference between the surprisals -log Pn(x) and the Kolmogorov complexities K(x) is smaller than or equal to the complexity K(Pn) of the enumerable distribution Pn(x). This complexity K(Pn) is the length of a shortest code specifying the probabilities Pn(x). Hence, as a rule, the more probabilities (one for each object category) to be specified, the larger K(Pn) is. Thus, Equation 21 implies: The simpler the probability distribution is, the closer complexities and surprisals are, that is, the closer simplicity and likelihood are.
Translated to perception, Equation 21 shows that there is indeed some truth in Pomerantz and Kubovy's (1986) proposal to design descriptive codes with lengths equal to surprisals (see The Age of Information, above), at least, if the current probability distribution is a simple distribution--if not, then their advice cannot be followed. In contrast, Leeuwenberg and Boselie's (1988) advice to use precisals as probabilities can always be followed, with an effectiveness that depends on how simple or complex the current probability distribution is. ,This also indicates that precisals seem to defy the traditional distinction between objective probabilities based, for example, on frequencies of occun~nce in the external world and subjective probabilities generated by the intemal cognitive system. That is, (neural equivalents of) precisals are perhaps generated internally, but they are actually very objective because they are neither subject dependent nor world dependent. It seems therefore better to qualify them as neutral probabilities, that is, as educated guesses that are not a priori biased (rightly or wrongly) toward any particular set of probabilities.
Discussion
Much of the mathematics in AIT can be qualified as a sort of "fuzzy" mathematics (as reflected, e.g., by "equality up to a constant"). This part shows, however, that such fuzzy mathematics may lead to deep insights in the relation between simplicity and likelihood. This is illustrated by the Fundamental Inequality in Equation 21, which can be seen as the result, so far, of AIT's quest for universal probabilities. Equation 21 holds for priors (replace x by H) as well as, separately, for conditionals (replace x by DIH). 8 Now, as proved in AIT, if both the prior and conditional probability distributions are simple distributions, then there is one hypothesis H that is (almost) optimal according to both the likelihood principle and the simplicity principle (see Li & VitLqyi, 1997, p. 359) . This situation, however, does not seem to apply to perception: The viewpoint-dependent conditional complexities and probabilities seem to be close but not the viewpoint-independent prior complexities and probabilities (see above).
Nevertheless, the latter perceptual divergence, as such, seems to be captured by Equation 21. That is, as I already argued intuitively in the Discussion section of The Simplicity and Likelihood Principles in Perception, above (see also Figures 2 and 4) , the conditional probabilities in the miniature world of a single stimulus generally concern only a few categories and are therefore more prone to form a rather 8 AIT provides proofs for priors and conditionals, respectively. For the priors, a mild condition is that hypothesis H should be "typical" for the prior probability distribution, that is, H should not be extremely unlikely. Similarly, for the conditionals, a mild condition is that data D should be "typical" for hypothesis H, that is, D should not be extremely unlikely induced by H (this resembles the general Viewpoint assumption from the first part, The Simplicity and Likelihood Principles in Perception). An exact mathematical definition of "typical" has been formulated by AIT pioneer Martin-L6f (1966) . simple (and probably enumerable) probability distribution. This suggests, by Equation 21, a small margin between simplicity and likelihood, that is, a high veridicality of precisals. It contrast, the prior probabilities in the real world concern an enormous diversity of categories and could therefore well be forming a rather complex (and perhaps not even enumerable) probability distribution. This suggests, by Equation 21, a large margin between simplicity and likelihood, that is, a low veridicality of precisals.
The perhaps large prior margin seems to question the survival value of a visual system using precisals, but, in this respect, the next two observations might be relevant. First, the foregoing suggests that precisals are highly veridical in a man-made city environment (restricted shape diversity) but not in a natural jungle environment (enormous shape diversity). Jungle hunters indeed rely on smell and hearing, rather than on sight (Seman bin Samad and Awang bin Alok, members of the West Malaysian indigenous Jakun people, personal communication; August 12, 1994) . This hunting strategy would probably be less necessary if vision used the highly veridical real-world probabilities--so, perhaps, it actually uses the less veridical precisals. Furthermore, perhaps, mankind tends to reduce its surrounding shape diversity (e.g., by building cities) because, among other things, it wants an environment in which precisals are more veridical.
Second, real-world frequencies of occurrence reflect just one of various traditional ideas, within the likelihood paradigm, about the prior probabilities used by the visual system (see the first part, above). A convenient summary of these traditional ideas is perhaps given by the universal distribution, re(x), which, after all, is fairly close to many probability distributions. Within the likelihood paradigm, this as such would not be very helpful regarding an actual quantification of probabilities, but, by the Coding Theorem, it would imply that one could use just as well the better quantifiable precisals from the simplicity paradigm. In the following General Discussion, I argue, among other things, that this would be a very acceptable option for (models of) everyday perception.
General Discussion
The likelihood paradigm leads, by way of the surprisal concept, to a plausible measurement of information but not to (complexities of) descriptive codes as used in the simplicity paradigm. Inversely, the simplicity paradigm leads, by way of the precisal concept, to probabilities that can be compared directly to the probabilities considered in the likelihood paradigm. Indeed, the scientific drive behind the simplicity paradigm has been, from the start, to fmd a way to circumvent the problem that the real probabilities are unknown. Hence, the proper way to compare the simplicity and likelihood principles is to consider both principles as modeling perception as using (a neural equivalent of) probabilities that determine what the interpretation of a stimulus will be. More specifically, by the likelihood principle, these perceptual probabilities are assumed to be evolution-installed real-world probabilities yielding veridical perception by definition. By the simplicity principle, the perceptual probabilities are assumed to be "minimum energy" precisals which, as implied by AIT findings, seem to yield fairly veridical perception as an emergent feature.
The idea, within the likelihood paradigm, that the perceptual probabilities are attuned evolutionarily to the external real-word probabilities is perhaps very plausible but not obviously true. That is, the inverse seems to occur just as well, implying that the perceptual probabilities may well have an internal origin in the form of, for example, precisals. For instance, in biology research, it is widely believed that flower shapes (and, hence, the frequencies of occurrence of particular shapes) are attuned to the visual systems of pollinating insects: the latter had evolved vision about 400 million years ago, whereas flowers evolved only about 120 million years ago (see, e.g., Enquist & Arak, 1994; Heywood, 1993; Horridge, 2000) . Be that as it may, whether real-world probabilities or precisals constitute a better model for the human perceptual probabilities remains a matter of empirical research.
The present study suggests that such empirical research is to be focused on the viewpoint-independent prior aspects of perception because the viewpoint-dependent aspects of perception seem to be captured as well by conditional complexities as by conditional probabilities. As I argue next, this implies that such empirical research is to be performed in controlled laboratory situations because ecologically realistic real-life situations trigger primarily conditional effects.
In a controlled laboratory situation, single static stimuli can be presented. In such a case, the priors and conditionals of candidate interpretations are equally decisive, so that, by controlling for the conditionals, one may investigate the priors. This, however, seems hardly possible in real-life situations. In everyday perception, a moving observer usually gets a growing sample D of different views (i.e., proximal stimuli) of the same distal scene. The interpretation of this growing sample D of views can be modeled by means of a recursive application of Bayes's rule as follows.
Let the sample D consist, at first, of only one view, with H i (i = 1, 2 .... ) as the candidate interpretations for which the~prior and conditional probabilities p(Hi) and p(D[/-/~) are known, so that the posterior probabilities P(Hi [D ) can be determined by applying Bayes's role. Then, each time an additional view enters the sample D, the previously computed posterior probabilities P(Hi [D ) can be taken as the new prior probabilities p(Hi) which, together with the conditional probabilities P(DlHi) for the expanded sample D, can be used to determine new posterior probabilities by again applying Bayes's rule. Generally, this process converges rapidly (i.e., after only a few recursions) on the "true" interpretation, that is, the interpretation that will remain the most likely one when sample D is expanded further (cf. Li & Vit,fmyi, 1997, p. 321) . 9 In other words, on the basis of only a few (not too atypical) views of a distal scene, it is thus possible to infer reliable predictions about subsequent views.
The recursive application of Bayes's rule implies that, after a few recursions, the effect of the first priors fades away because the substituted priors are continuously updated on the basis of the conditionals which, thereby, become the decisive entities. This illustrates that real-life situations trigger primarily conditional effects, which, in fact, implies that one could just as well use precisals instead of the real probabilities (especially if the latter are unknown). After all, the error of using precisals as first priors fades away, while the error of using precisals as conditionals is probably 9 Convergence is not always guaranteed (cf. Diaconis & Freedman, 1986) , but, here, I sidestep this formal problem, which is perhaps not even a perceptual problem. After all, ambiguity is a typical perceptual phenomenon. I also sidestep the question of whether the determination of the set of candidate interpretations is knowledge-driven (as seems to agree with the likelihood paradigm) or data-driven (as seems to agree with the simplicity paradigm). This might imply different sets, but, even then, it is hardly a problem because, generally, the overlap of the sets is probably such that each set has its "true" interpretation inside this overlap. very small, given that conditional complexities and probabilities seem to be very close (note that the error applies to the difference between precisals and real-world probabilities and that it remains to be seen which ones are used by the perceptual system). In other words, no matter whether precisals or real probabilities are used, the recursive application of Bayes's rule seems to converge generally on the same "true" interpretation. The only advantage of real probabilities, when used as first priors, is that the speed of convergence is optimal. If they are unknown, then one could use, for example, uniform first priors, as has been proposed in the likelihood paradigm (see The Simplicity and Likelihood Principles in Perception, above): One might also use the precisals as, say, educated guesses of the first priors. Be that as it may, the recursive application of Bayes's rule suggests that, in everyday perception, the simplicity and likelihood principles are in fact functionally equivalent (i.e., generally yield the same "true" interpretation). This means that precisals seem to accomplish what Solomonoff (1964a Solomonoff ( , 1964b aimed at: finding universal probabilities that can be used to perform inductive inference, whenever the real probabilities are unknown, with about the same predictive power.
As indicated, the foregoing suggests directions for empirical research aiming at differentiating between the simplicity and likelihood principles. More importantly, however, it also implies that either principle (each with its own priors) may have guided the evolution of visual systems--after all, seeing organisms are generally able to move as well and could therefore perform something like Bayesian inference. In fact, the evolutionarily better choice seems to be the simplicity principle because its precisals form a convenient neutral quantification of probabilities, which can be seen as an educated guess about the real-world probabilities in many different worlds. As argued, the usage of precisals suggests that, virtually independent of the current real world, simplest descriptive codes yield not only a (near) minimal STM burden but also fairly veridical perception. Whatever the actual perceptual probabilities may be, this study shows in any case that, scientifically, the simplicity paradigm may provide perception models with the necessary quantitative specifications of the often plausible but also intuitive ideas provided by the likelihood paradigm.
Summary and Conclusion
An appropriate qualification of the perceptual simplicity and likelihood principles, as reviewed in the first part, seems to be given by the first sentence of Tolstoy's Anna Karenina: "Happy families are all alike; every unhappy family is unhappy in its own way." The happy thing about the simplicity paradigm is that different descriptive coding languages nonetheless are alike in the sense that they yield about the same complexity for a given stimulus interpretation. This has been shown empirically by Simon (1972) and mathematically by AIT's Invarlance Theorem, andit implies that simplicity is apparently a fairly stabte concept. In contrast, within the likelihood paradigm, a variety of quite different real-world probability distributions over stimulus interpretations has been proposed. They are based on frequencies of occurrence in this world, on familiarity, on biological relevance, on ontogenetically acquired knowledge, or on phylogenetically acquired knowledge. Each of these options may be intuitively plausible but also unhappy in the sense that it is not clear which actual (i.e., quantified) probabilities are to be related to which categories of interpretations.
Even if, in the likelihood paradigm, the categorization problem were to be solved (e.g., by using descriptive codes, just to specify the categories), there would still be the problem of deciding which related real-world probabilities were to be quantified and how. In theory, the latter problem could be solved by turning to AIT's universal distribution re(x), which, as discussed above, is fairly close to many different probability distributions and which thereby implies that likelihood, too, could be seen as a fairly stable concept. Then again, one could just as well use the better quantifiable precisals p = 2 -1 from the simplicity paradigm, where I is the complexity of the simplest descriptive code of an interpretation. After all, as shown by AIT's Coding Theorem, these precisals are equivalent to re(x).
Within the likelihood paradigm, the usage of precisals might indeed be an appealing option, particularly to quantify conditional probabilities which, just like conditional complexities, account for viewpoint-dependent aspects of perception. As I argued on the basis of both perceptual and mathematical evidence, the simplicity and likelihood principles are perhaps very different regarding prior complexities and probabilities (accounting for viewpointindependent aspects), but they seem very close regarding conditional complexities and probabilities. It remains to be seen how big the prior gap between complexities and probabilities is. As argued in the fourth part, The Relation Between Simplicity and Likelihood, this prior gap depends on the probability distribution adopted in the likelihood paradigm, and it can, therefore, be assessed only when the likelihood paradigm has developed a quantification of its probabilities. Even then, as argued in the General Discussion, the apparent absence of a conditional gap between complexities and probabilities suggests that the two principles are functionally equivalent in everyday perception by a moving observer. Because seeing organisms are generally able to move as well, this implies that either principle may have guided the evolution of visual systems. The only difference, in this respect, is that the likelihood principle suggests that Vision has over time adapted fully to one particular world, whereas the simplicity principle suggests that vision was fairly adapted beforehand to many different worlds. This suggests in turn that, at early evolutionary stages, likelihood-based vision might have been adapted poorly and might well have had substantially more difficulty surviving than simplicity-based vision.
Because of the domain differences between perception and AIT, as reviewed in the third part, Structural Versus Algorithmic Information Theory, the mathematical AIT proofs probably cannot be taken as pertaining fully to perception. However, the AIT proofs can be taken as strong evidence that the precisal concept p = 2 -z from the simplicity paradigm has considerable advantages over the classical surprisal concept 1 = -lOgE(p) in which p is the likelihood paradigm's real-word probability of an interpretation:
First, surprisals represent a theoretically plausible measurement of information, but they suffer from the problem that a concrete specification of the underlying categories and related probabilities is lacking. This problem does not apply to precisals, that is, the underlying descriptive codes yield the categories while the related complexities have a fairly univocal quantification.
Second, surprisals imply optimal encoding suggesting a minimal STM burden but at the cost of using purely nominalistic label codes that, moreover, may have to be different in length for each current probability distribution. In contrast, precisals imply near optimal encoding by means of simplest descriptive codes and for any arbitrary enumerable probability distribution.
Third, surprisals represent, by definition, veridical perception only in the world that gave rise to the probability distribution underlying them. Precisals, however, seem to yield fairly veridical perception in many different words--not by definition but as an emergent feature.
Finally, this study of course does not settle the perceptual simplicity-likelihood controversy, because, among other reasons, both paradigms still have various loose ends. However, the fundamental AIT insights do shed a refreshing light on the controversy, enabling future discussions to be focused more directly on the really controversial issues. Such a controversial issue seems to concern, in particular, the viewpoint-independent aspects of perception--as opposed to the viewpoint-dependent aspects which, as this study has shown, seem hardly controversial. In this study, the perceptually crucial distinction between these two types of aspects, as well as the role of this distinction in the simplicity-likelihood controversy, could be made more explicit by combining perceptual findings with mathematical findings from AIT. AIT research has always tended to focus on bridging the gap between simplicity and likelihood, rather than on emphasizing that this gap is unbridgeably large. Therefore, perhaps the most important message this study aims to transmit is the conclusion implied by this AIT research: If one has access to the real probabilities, then, by all means, use them if not, as is the case in perception research and maybe also in perception itself, then precisals form a good alternative.
